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ABSTRACT
This study has its foundation on a model developed by Holden, Holden and Suss
(1979) . The model is on the determinants of the flexibility of an exchange rate.
These determinants are: the openness of an economy; the level of economic
development; the diversification of the external sector; geographical
concentration of trade; the mobility of capital and the inflation differential.
In the present study, the model by Holden , et al is adapted in order to determine
whether SADC forms an optimum currency area or not. SADC has a number of
objectives which it aims to achieve. One of these objectives is the formation of a
monetary union in the future. This is the widest objective for SADC and the path
towards achieving this is the establishment of a Trade Protocol that aims to form
a Free Trade Area in the region.
A number of criteria have to be assessed in order to determine whether SADC
does form an optimum criteria or not. The Holden et. al model forms the basis for
this assessment. The model reveals that SADC does not form an optimum
currency area. SADC has not yet converged on the criteria for a monetary union.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
SADC has as one of its wider objectives the formation of a monetary union in
future. This will have major consequences for the relationship between SADC
members regarding trade, and policy measures taken in the region. SADC is
currently undergoing negotiations over a Trade Protocol that aims to form a
Free Trade Area in the region. Whether a monetary union in SADC will
succeed or not is another question and this question can be answered by
looking at the criteria for forming such regions and then assessing whether
SADC conforms to the criteria or not.
Globalisation and integration, as in forming regions and opening up trade,
have brought about concerns on the type of exchange rate policy that will be
suitable at the country level and the regional level. Countries and regions
have often been pushed towards choosing between flexible and fixed
exchange types of exchange rate policy since these are the most frequently
pronounced types of exchange rate policy in economic literature. Many
regions contemplate pegging their currencies against another currency or a
basket of currencies . Some of those regions are in Africa and they include
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) as mentioned above.
COMESA has as one of its objectives forming a monetary union, as with
SADC.
The path to monetary union formation has been paved by the European (
Monetary Union', which saw a successful move into the currency union . )
Other regions may be encouraged, therefore, to follow suit. However, Frenkel
(1999) argues that no single currency regime is right for all countries at all
I The European Monetary Union (EMU) comprises 11 European countries. these are: Austria.
Belgium, Netherlands. Finland. France. Germany. Ireland. Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.
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times. This is, indeed, the conventional wisdom on currency regimes.
Countries' characteristics and circumstances are the ones that should
determine the type of exchange rate policy that they should adopt. Regions
should establish their state of being against the suitable criteria, which
determine the success of a currency union .
The theory on optimum currency areas has brought some light into the
characteristics of areas in which a single currency regime is optimal as
Mundell (1961) suggests (cited in Mckinnon, 1996). Mckinnon (1996)
develops the idea of optimality by discussing the openness of the economy.
He regards openness as one of the factors that determine the optimum size
of the domain of a single currency. Openness is defined as the ratio of
tradable to nontradable goods. Mckinnon (1996) suggests that if the optimum
currency area is sufficiently large such that the non-tradables are large ,
pegging the value of the domestic currency to the nontradable goods is
sufficient to give money liquidity value in the eyes of the residents of the
area , but not in the eyes of potential investors. Mckinnon (1996) however
suggests that investor perceptions should not override the goals of internal
capital accumulation and full employment, since these are much more
important that the external capital movements. Flexible external exchange
rates would be optimal only when the trade patterns are unstable to such an
extent that relative price changes in tradables and non-tradabies are needed
to maintain external balance and full employment.
On the other hand, if the ratio of tradables to non-tradables is large, i.e.
implying that the optimum currency area is small , and the prices of the
tradables are fixed to the outside currency, then it is optimal for the area to
peg against the outside currency. Resultantly, a number of small areas that
trade extensively with each other would peg with each other (Mckinnon,
1996, 246). Mckinnon also suggests that capital movements among small
areas are necessary to promote efficient economic specialisation and
growth more so than in large , economically developed areas. Therefore, a
common currency would facilitate contractual arrangements for the movement
of capital.
The choice between flexible and a fixed exchange rate policy is a choice
between two extreme types of exchange rates . There are a number of
intermediate types of exchange rate regimes that tend to be ignored by
economic literature. Frenkel (1999) identifies the following 9 types of
exchange rate regimes from the most rigid , to the most flexible exchange rate
regime:
1.1.1 A currency union, In a currency union , the same currency circulates
among members. Examples of a currency union are some East
Caribbean Islands which use the dollar; and the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). Members of a currency union co-ordinate
their exchange rate policy, monetary policy and fiscal policy .
1.1.2 A currency board. A currency board is a monetary institution that
issues currency only that is fully backed by foreign assets (Frenkel
1999, 14). What distinguishes a currency board from a currency union
is that (a) an exchange rate is not fixed by policy , but by law; (b) a
reserve requirement stipulating that each dollar's worth of domestic
currency is backed by a dollar's worth of foreign reserves ; and (c) a
self-correcting balance of payments mechanism, where a payments
deficit automatically contracts the money supply, resulting in a
contraction of spending.
1.1 .3 A "truly fixed" exchange rate. This is where countries fix their
currencies to a strong currency. For an example, members of the West
African and Central African currency unions fix to '(he French Franc
and many other countries fix to the US dollar for example the Brazilian
Peso.
1.1.4 An adjustment peg. This refers to the Bretton Woods regime where
currencies were fixed but adjustable. Countries with fixed exchange
rates period ically realign them.
1.1.5 A crawling peg. Highly inflated countries usually use the crawling
peg. The peg can be set regularly as often as weekly in a series of
mini devaluations. One strategy is to set the crawl lower than the
forecasted rate of inf lation in order to help work the country out of its
inflation cycle. Another strategy is to index the exchange rate to the
price level thereby giving up the fight against inflation and ensuring a
steady real exchange rate.
1.1.6 A basket peg. The exchange rate is fixed in terms of a weighted
basket of foreign currencies instead of one major currency. This type
of exchange rate regime suits countries with trade patterns that are
highly diversified geographically.
1.1.7 A target zone or band. In this type of exchange rate regime,
authorities intervene when the exchange rate hits pre-announced
margins on either side of a central parity. The European Monetary
System (EMS) exchange rate mechanism (ERM) is an example from
1979, until the EMU was established in 1999.
1.1.8 A managed float (or dirty float). The Central Bank stands ready to
intervene in the foreign exchange market without defending any
particular parity. A currency is bought when it rises, i.e. is depreciating,
and sold when it falls , i.e. is appreciating.
1.1.9 A free float. The Central Bank does not intervene in the fore ign
exchange market. Supply and demand for the currency is allowed to
clear on its own. The country that is closest to a free float is the United
States.
The above clearly indicate that exchange rate regimes are not limited to
flex ible and fixed exchange rates. There is a host of intermediate exchange
rate regimes. Different exchange rate regimes would suit countries and
regions differently depending on the countries ' characteristics and
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circumstances. A number of currencies have been tied together against other
currencies as joint floats and thus forming exchange rate unions. An
exchange rate union is not a monetary union , but members of this union
maintain fixed rates between themselves and retain their central bank and
control over monetary policy. This union is also called a "pseudo exchange
rate union" (Marston, 1984 and Corden, 1972).
This study concentrates on SADC. The following section outl ines the main
aims of this study.
1.2 The aim of the study
The question that this project aims to answer is: Do the members of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) form an optimum currency
area in terms of exchange rate arrangements between its members and the
country characteristics that determine such areas? An optimum currency area
is defined as a region for which it is optimal to have a single currency and a
single monetary policy. Mckinnon (1996) describes the word "optimal" as a
single currency area within which monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external
exchange rates can be used to give the best resolution of three objectives: 1)
maintaining full employment; 2) maintaining balanced international payments
and; 3) maintaining a stable internal average price !evel. The country
characteristics are the most important ingredients in assessing eligibility for a
monetary union. There is consensus in economic integration theory that wage
and price flexibil ity, capital mobil ity between sectors of the econom ies in a
region and openness of the economies in the region all contribute positively
to the co-ordination of exchange rate policy. It is upon similar criteria taken
from economic . literature that SADC will be assessed for currency union
eligibility.
Theory on regional integration suggests that countries
o whose external sector is highly diversified;
o whose economies are highly open ;
o whose inflation rates do not diverge a lot from their trading partners;
o whose capital is highly mobile; and
o whose level of economic development is high , are very good candidates
for a monetary (or currency) union.
A model developed by Holden , Holden and Suss (1979) suggests that the
above factors significantly determine the fixation of an exchange rate. SADC
currently contemplates becoming a Free Trade Area. This will have major
effects on the level of openness in the region , the diversification of the
external sector, the development of the economy, etc. as in the factors stated
above .
1.3 Research methodology
The method of research employed in this study involves:
1.3.1 analysing the literature on optimum currency areas. The aim is to give
an insight on the issues involved in this research. The factors that
determine the success of a monetary union are evaluated. Also , the
model developed by Holden et. al (1979) is used to support the theory
on the determinants of forming and optimum currency area. The model
is used to determine if SADC forms an optimum currency area . Details
about the model are given in chapter 4.
1.3.2 Collecting data in order to run the above model. The data is extracted
from the following main sources:
1.3.2.1 The International Financial Statistics
1.3.2.2 The Direction of Trade Statistics
1.3.2.3 The United Nations yearbook
1.3.2.4 The World Bank Development Indicators
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A detailed discussion of these sources and the type of data that is extracted
from them is given in the fourth chapter of this research.
What follows is a brief historical account of SADC, i.e. when the region was
formed , why it was formed , its organisational structure and its objectives . It is
against this background that one can proceed with assessing whether SADC
forms an optimum currency area or not in terms of the relevant criteria arising
out of the theory for the co-ordination of exchange rate policy.
J 1.4 A Historical background on SADC.
SADC was established in August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia by signing
the Declaration and Treaty. The treaty replaced the Southern African Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC), an organisation which was formed in
Lusaka , Zambia on April , 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka
Declaration-Southern Africa which aimed at economic liberation by nine
members which were Angola , Botswana , Lesotho , Malawi , Mozambique,
Swaziland , Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC sectorial briefs 1999.)
1.4.1 Rationale for SADC
SADC was formed out of the recognit ion by Southern African countries of the
need for close co-operation among the governments and people of Southern
Africa . The driving force was the state of backwardness in the Southern
African countries which had developed in the 1960s when the struggle for
polit ical independence in the region gained momentum , leading to a need for
collective action in the region (The SADC handbook, 1999). Southern African
countries ultimately achieved political independence against a backdrop of
mass poverty and econom ic backwardness (The SADC handbook, 1999).
The need to work collectively was initiated through bilateral co-operation and
through Front-line State groupings. A meeting in May 1979 by the Foreign
Ministers of the Front-l ine States" in Gaborone, Botswana, led to the Arusha
Conference in July 1979 which brought together for the first time,
governmene and international agency representatives from all parts of the
world to discuss regional co-operation in Southern Africa. This Conference
led to the landmark Lusaka Summit, held in the Zambian capital in April 1980,
the day on which SADCC was formed. SADCC committed itself "to pursue
policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of our
national economies" (The SADC handbook, 1999). SADCC did not aim to
create a free-trade area or a common market. The Front-Line States began
negotiations on establishing SADCC in 1978. SADCC aimed at "promoting
regional co-operation and integration to accelerate econom ic growth in order
to improve living conditions of the people of Southern Africa and to reduce
their external economic dependence, particularly that with South Africa"( The
SADC handbook, 1999).
The oil price shocks of the 1970s, the world economic recession in the 1980's
and drought affected most SADCC member countries and led to balance of
payments difficulties. SADCC was formed because of the ant icipation that
SADCC would help alleviate balance of payments problems by "opening up
the regional markets for exports and imports that would use national
currencies and release needed foreign exchange for imports of machinery
and technology for further development" (Kisanga, 1991, 135). The following
tables indicate the vulnerability of SADCC at the time.
2 Front-Line States are Angola. Botswana. Mozambique. Tanzania. Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Botswana. Tanzania and Zambia were the first Front-L ine States formed in 197-1- . Mozambique and
Angola joined in 1975 and 1976 respectively. following the overthrow of the Portuguese colonial rule.
Zimbabwe joined in 1980 following its independence. The Front-Line States acted as : "a caucus on
Southern African affairs both inside and outside the continent" (Kisanga, 199L 175).
3 In the meeting held in 1979. Lesotho , Malawi and Swaziland. who were the majority-ruled states in
Southern Africa, were also invited to participate in the negotiations for the formation of SADe
(Kisanga, 1991, 129).
Table 1.1: Basic data on SADCC countries, 1988
Country Population .Area GNP l! $ per .' Export . Imports
... (millions) ' c"
I . .
('()OO) ' $ mn. capita sot of
.:




'eUld : .. and. '
.>I ," .•.. service .service ,. "
>'






'. .," .",., .... I .• ". .... ,: . ..... :... .
Angola 9.4 1,247 10,430 1,136Q 1,737 1,324
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Botswana 1.2 I 582 1,204 1,034 1,865 1,529
Lesotho 1.7 30 690 412 742 566
Malawi 8.2 118 1,320 162 334 516
Mozambique 15.0 802 1,550 104 179 1,006
Swaziland 0.7 17 580 787 667 558
Tanzania 24.7 I 945 3,780 153 499 1,479
Zambia 7.5 753 2,160 289 1,244 1,452
Zimbabwe 9.3 390 6,070 656 1,803 1,851
Total 77.7 I 4884 17,354£ 254£ 9,070 I 10,279
Notes: §..GND at current pnces; 12 1987; £.excludes Angola.
Source: Kisanga , 1991, 136
The table indicates, amongst other things , that by 1988, imports of goods and
services had exceeded exports in most of the SADCC member countries.
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Table 1.2: Growth of manufacturing value added, selected period and years in
SADCC states (at constant 1975 prices)
COUNTRY TOTAL MVAGROWTH PER CAPITAMVA VALUE
. , .•RATES (%) $
.'. .. ...... • •
..... . "
1963-73 , .1973..81 1968-73 1973'-81 1973 1981
" '.' .
Angola 10.2 -10.0 8.3 -12.2 51 15
Botswana 6.2 17.3 3.9 14.0 24 88
Lesotho 34.3 3.8 31.4 1.4 8 9
Malawi 14.9 6.4 11 .7 3.1 15 18
Mozambique 13.6 -6.6 11.1 -9.0 48 23
Swaziland 18.1 11.5 15.6 8.5 91 213
I Tanzania 10.2 -2.8 7.1 -5.7 18
1
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I Zambia 12.7 -0.7 9.5 -3.8 86 67
Zimbabwe 10.9 2.8 7.0 -0.6 138 145
Source: Kisanqa , 1991, 137
As indicated by the table, the growth in manufacturing value added in SAOCC
fell from 1963 to 1981. This indicates that there was less manufacturing and
the members were mainly primary good producers.
The above-mentioned poor record of performance in SAOCC regarding more
imports than exports and less foreign exchange, debt service rose . Table 1.3
and appendix 0 , indicate the levels of the external public debt and debt
service in SAOCC between 1970 and 1988. Then Appendix E shows total
debt service as a percentage of GNP.
II
Table 1.3: External public debt in selected years and manufacturing sector's
share.
COUNTRY EXTERNAL PUBLIC AND PUBLICITY "' MANUFACTURING





.-". "., --.-,- .-. -...:-. ··v. ~~.:, .
J%)\ .....•
" . " .
.- ,:, (US $ MILLlONS) -
.. . " .
. . ..
1983 1983 1983I',.. ,i . 1970 1982
Angola - 558.0 - - -
Botswana 14.7 209.0 383.9 - -
Lesotho 8.1 138.6 222.3 3.3 1
Malawi 122.4 691 .8 860.3 0.6 0
Mozambique - 585.0 - - -
Swaziland 37.0 177.7 245.4 36.7 15
Tanzania 248.5 1,631 .6 3,234.5 465.1 14
Zambia 622.5 2,380.6 3,210.4 321.0 10
Zimbabwe 232.7 1,220.8 2,166.6 74.6 3
Sou~e:~sanga , 1991 , 148
SADCC countries had great demand for fore ign currency to import industria l
technology and meet its current debt servicing as a result of industrial
development since the 1960's. SADCC countries borrowed to finance imports
and their debt levels rose and the region was therefore vulnerable to
pressures from the World Bank and the IMF to implement structural
adjustment programmes for finance. The structural adjustment programmes
involved, among others , deflationary pol icies and the devaluation of the
currency (Kisanga, 1991, 135-149).
Initially SADC excluded South Afr ica and one of the objectives of SADC was
to reduce dependence on South Africa. However, South Africa elected to join
SADC in 1994 during its process of politica l trans ition. The South African
government elected in April 1994 placed regional co-operation at the
forefront of its foreign policy and was convinced that membership in SADC
would benefit South Africa (Brummerhoff, 1998, 37).
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SADC head quarters are situated in Gaborone, Botswana and each member
state has the responsibility to co-ordinate a sector or sectors on behalf of
others. Initially, the main objective of the regional group was to promote an
improvement in transport and communication between members. Later,
issues relating to trade, food security, energy and industry were introduced
(Holden, 1998,6). Sectoral divisions amongst members are as follows:
~ Table 1.4 Sectoral responsibilities of SADC members
COUNT~'" ' I " SECTOR
' .
" /0
. '-:..:-; -," . "' ,.
Angola energy
Botswana Agricultural research; livestock production and anima l
disease control
Lesotho Water; environment and land management
Malawi Inland fisheries ; forestry and wildlife
Mauritius Tourism
Mozambique Culture and information; transport and communication
Namibia Marine fisheries and Resources
South Africa finance and investment and health
Swaziland Human resources development
Tanzania Industry and Trade
Zambia Mining; employment and labour
Zimbabwe Food , agr iculture and natural resources; and crop protect ion
Source: The SADe handbook (1999).
Divisional responsib ilities fac ilitate co-ordination and the ease in the
movement of capital , labour, goods and services and technology between the
members of SADC. This is one of SADC's main objectives as out lined later in
this chapter .
Currently, member states in SADC are Ango la, Botswana, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia ,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. New
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membership to the regional group may be allowed by a unanimous decision
of the SADC summit and upon acceding to the SADC treaty. The following
section looks at the treaty governing SADC.
1.2.2 The treaty
The SADC treaty is a legally binding and all-encompassing framework by
which member countries shall co-ordinate, harmonise and rationalise their
policies and strategies for sustainable development in all areas of human
behaviour (The SADC handbook, 1999). The Treaty commits members to the
following principles: sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace
and security; human rights ; democracy and rule of law; equity; balance and
mutual benefit. The treaty also commits members and their governments
towards fully involving the people in the region , and non-governmental
organisations in the process of regional integration (The SADC handbook,
1999). Members who fail to fulfil obligations assumed under the treaty shall
be sanctioned against and the Summit will determine sanctions on a case by
case basis. Without the treaty, it would be virtually difficult or impossible to
achieve sustainable development in the region.
When countries integrate, it is important to have the structural responsibilities
of different bodies clearly laid out. The distribution of these responsibilities
among different bodies ensures adherence to the treaty and provides an
organised way of carrying out the objectives of the region. The next section
therefore covers the organisational structure of SADC and the division of
responsibilities among the various levels.
1.4.3 How is SADC organised?












The summit is the ultimate policy-making institution of SADC made up by
heads of state. It is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of
the regional group. The council is made up by ministers from each member
state who are responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of
SADC and ensuring that policies are properly implemented, such as, deciding
upon sectoral areas of co-operation and the allocation of responsibility for
carrying out these sectoral activities. The Council advises the Summit and
approves SADC policies , strategies and work programs. A permanent
secretary or an official of equivalent rank represents the Standing Committee
of Officials from each member state. It acts as a technical advisory committee
to the Council to whom it reports. National Contact Points are responsible for
regular consultation with the briefings of relevant government institutions, the
enterprise community and media on matters related to SADC. Sectoral
Contact Points are all government ministries with line responsibilities for
SADC sectors. They work closely with the Sector Co-ordinating Units in the
preparation of sectoral policies and strategies, and formulation of project
proposals. The secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and
is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programs.
The Tribunal ensures adherence to, and proper interpretation of the SADC
Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and adjudicates disputes that are referred
to it (The SADC handbook by the Secretariat, 1999).
This organisational structure ensures easier implementation of the objectives
of the region as outlined in the following section.
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1.4.4 SADC's objectives
SADC's objectives can be referred to as the challenges that the region faces .
It is upon the achievement of these objectives that SADC can realise
sustainable development as is the intention of the Treaty. Currently, SADC
has the following objectives as stated in The SADC handbook:
• To achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.
• To evolve common political values, systems and institutions.
• To promote and defend peace and security.
• To promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the inter-dependence of member States.
• To achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programs.
• To promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of
resources of the region.
• To achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective
protection of the environment.
• To strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and
cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.
For the expected results to be realised in the region, the objectives must be
implemented. The above objectives are the plan for SADC to shape up the
foundation for the achievement of sustainable development in the region . In
order for SADC to achieve the above objectives, it shall (The SADC
handbook, 1999):
• Harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member
States.
• Mobilise the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives
to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to
participate fully in the implementation of the programs and projects of
SADC.
• Create appropriate institut ions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of
requisite resources for the implementation of the programs and
operations of SADC and its institutions.
• Develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free
movement of capital and labour, goods and services , and of the people
of the region generally among member States.
• Promote the development of human resources.
• Promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology.
• . Improve economic management and performance through regional
co-operation.
• Promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations
of member States.
• Secure international understanding, co-operation and support , mobilise
the inflow of public and private resources into the region.
• Develop such other activities as member States may decide in furtherance
of the objectives of SADC.
This is how SADC plans to improve the standards of living of the members of
the region, thereby achieving sustainable development. This implies that
SADC is not only concerned with achieving its objectives but is mainly
concerned with sustaining the improvements in the levels of development of
its members. The term 'sustainable development' is a very important term as
it emphasises the implications of economic policy and activity on future
generations (Reid, 1995).
SADC has recently extended its aims when the heads of states of the
member countries signed the Trade Protocol in 1996. The protocol seeks to
establish a single market in the region . The protocol sets a programme for the
gradual reduction and elimination of tariffs in SADC leading to the
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establishment of a free trade area" in the region (Kalenga, 1999, 12). The
protocol came into force in January 2000. Intra-regional trade is expected to
rise from the current level of 22% because of the protocol (Madakufamba,
1999). A few years ago, intra-regional trade in SADC was 12% but then rose
to 22%, its present rate. The SADC deputy executive Secretary expects intra-
regional trade to rise to 35% by 2005 because of the protocol (Madakufamba,
1999). Therefore SADC is moving towards more co-operation and interaction
between members.
SADC has set up targets for itself and these involve:
o Creating a Free Trade Area as stated earlier on. This was institutionalised
when the heads of state of the member countries signed the Trade
Protocol in August 1996,
o Setting up a regional rapid deployment peacekeeping force that will
contain conflicts and clashes that occur between members of the region,
o Enabling the members to reap the benefits of cheap South African
electricity by establishing the Southern African power pool,
o Establishing a regional development bank, and
o Establishing a regional parliament.
SADC does not necessarily stand alone as a regional group in Southern
Africa. There are a number of other regional groups and different types of
regional agreements between the Southern African countries. Most members
of SADC are also members in these other regional groups. This may lead to
spillover effects of SADC plans to these other regions. SADC, therefore, need
not ignore the policies of these other regional groups. A deeper description
on these regional groups, their inter-relationships and developments is given
in chapter 2.
The theory underpinning this study is provided in Chapter 3 of this project
where the implications of a monetary union; the criteria for formation of such
.j A free trade area is defined in chapter two with other forms of regional integration.
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regional groups ; the characteristics of countries which enter such regional
groups; and the assessment of SADC based on this criteria is performed.
Chapter 4 gives an econometric model that is used in evaluating the
determinants of exchange rate policy and in evaluating whether SADC
countries form an optimum currency area or not. The background to the
econometric study and the results of the study are then given . Chapter 5
concludes the study by highlighting the main findings of the study.
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2. Regional groups in Southern Africa.
This chapter aims to give a brief overview of the types of regional groups that
exist in Southern Africa and their development. What should be evident from
this chapter is that SADC is one of a number of Southern African regional
groups and that some members of SADC hold membership in these other
regional groups. It is important to consider these other Southern African
regional groups in the analysis of SADC because there may be spillover
effects and potential conflicts with SADC policies to these other regions.
These other regional groups are the Common Monetary Area (CMA),
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) , which involve only Southern
African countries, then the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) and the Common
Market For Eastern and Southern Afr ica (COMESA) which includes Southern
African and East African countries. The existence of these regional groups
highlights the existence of different types of economic integration in the
global economic world between countries. Keet (1999) writes that
"In Africa, the strategic objective of re-grouping African countries and
(re) integrating the continent was a fundamental reaction to the legacy
of colonialism; to arbitrarily created , artificial , largely non-viable and
distorted economies, characterised by pronounced under-development
and deep external dependence. Regional groupings in Africa were
conceived in the 1960's and 1970's as more rational economic units
and formally endorsed in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action . These
putative regions would provide larger markets and economies of scale
in investment and production, with combined or complementary
resources, and would generally be more effective frameworks within
which to correct disarticulated and ineffective economic structures."
Regional groups in Africa are formed with the aim of improving the economic ,
social and political conditions of the African States through co-operation.
Bela Balassa (1961) defines economic integration as a process and as a
state of affairs. As a process , it encompasses measures established to
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abolish discrimination between economic units that belong to different
national states . As a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of
various forms of discrimination between national economies. Countries that
engage in economic integration choose to improve the level of economic co-
operation and co-ordination between themselves and adopt a certain pattern
of treatment for non-members.
'):2.1 Forms of economic integration.
The world has seen countries strengthening ties with their neighbours
through regional groups. However, different forms of integration exist.
Generally, the following six types of economic integration are identified by
trade theory.
2.1.1 Preferential trade arrangements: This is the loosest form of economic
integration. Preferential trade areas provide lower barriers on trade among
participating nations than on trade with non-member nations (Salvatore,
1995, 299). Countries give special preference to each other in a region by
dampening the trade barriers between themselves.
2.1.2 Free-trade areas: Member countries trade with each other in the
absence of tariffs between themselves, but each country determines its own
tariffs for non-members. Recent developments in SADC have been the
negotiations for a free trade area in the region. Issues at the core of the
negotiations include rules of origin, the customs co-operation system to be
used in the region, and dispute management and support structures. These
negotiations will occur at the end of March in 'Mauritius . The negotiations
have to be finalised before the implementation of the EU free trade
agreement with South Africa so that it would be easier for the EU to
compensate SADC for the losses in revenue that would result from the EU-
South Africa free trade agreement (The Mercury, 2000, Jan. 18). The rules of
origin have become very important for SADC since most of the members in
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the region hold multiple membership with other regions. The aim of looking
closer at the rules of origin is to prevent an outsider from feeding goods into a
region through a low external tariff partner in the region , resulting in that good
competing unfairly with other goods produced in the region.
2.1.3 A customs union: member countries suppress discrimination among
each other on commodity movements and adopt a common tariff towards
non-members. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa and Botswana is a good example .
2.1.4 A common market: All that applies to a customs union also apply in a
common market, but additionally, a common market allows for the free
movement of labour and capital among member countries. A good example is
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa . In chapter one, it was
noted that one of SADC's objectives is "to develop policies aimed at the
progress ive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and
labour, goods and services, and of the people in the region". One can,
therefore argue that SADC aims to eventually become a common market in
the future when this objective is accomplished and a common tar iff adopted
towards non-members of the region .
2.1.5 An economic union: It goes beyond the common market by
harmonising the monetary and fiscal policies of member states. For example ,
the European Union harmon ised its monetary and fiscal policies first before
progressing to a monetary union .
2.1.6 A monetary union: In addition to the act ivities of an economic union , a
monetary union is the "full monetary integration of an area imposing a fixed
relationship between currencies and leads to a permanent absence of
exchange controls with respect to both current and capital account
transactions within the area" (Lundahl and Peterson, 1991, 271) . This is the
type of economic integration for which SADC is evaluated in this project.
Trade liberalisation between members of a regional group is a precondition
for co-ordinating exchange rate policy because openness is one of the most
important determinants of the success of a monetary union as will be shown
in the third chapter (Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994).
There is only one free trade area in South Africa, i.e. SACU. Trade should be
increased between countries before they co-ordinate exchange rate policy.
However, improving trade is not easy since a lot of other factors are to be
considered when countries regionally integrate to improve trade between
themselves by forming trade blocks. These other important factors are
considered next.
2.2 What are the effects of regional groups?
Regional groups are formed in order to reap the perceived benefits from
/
forming such groups. However, losses from forming such groups are also
present. Formation is in the perception that the benefits will outweigh the
losses. Regional groups result in trade creation effects; trade diversion
effects and economies of scale and these are all discussed below:
2.2.1 Trade creation and trade diversion effects.
The trade-creation and trade diversion effects become very important when
countries open up trade to each other. The trade literature points to the trade
creation and trade diversion effects of regional groupings when assessing
their desirability. The theory behind these effects is that regional groups
eliminate trade barriers between members and create a favourable trading
ground for members while discrim inating against non-members. Trade
creation results in increased trade among members of a regional group due
to the introduction of free trade between themselves. Here, domestic
production in a nation that is a member of a regional group is replaced by
low-cost imports from another member nation (Salvatore, 1995, 300). Each
country, therefore, is able to special ise according to intra-union comparative
advantage.
Trade diversion occurs when trade is shifted from a low-cost producer outside
the regional group to a high-cost producer inside the region. Trade diversion
reduces welfare since production is shifted from a more efficient producer
outside the regional group to a less efficient producer inside the region. The
international allocation of resources is thus worsened since production is
shifted away from comparative advantage (Salvatore, 1995, 302).
Regional groups usually result in both trade creation and trade diversion and
can therefore either increase or reduce the welfare of members depending on
the relative strengths of these two opposing forces.
Regional group members gain when a low-cost domestic producer, as a
result of intra-region comparative advantage, replaces a high-cost domestic
producer and increased output result. Integration is harmful however when a
low-cost producer from outside the region is excluded from the regional group
and trade diverted towards a high-cost producer inside the regional group.
Two important generalisations can be adopted from the traditional theory of
integration which are: 1) the larger the economic size of the integrated area
and the more numerous the countries of which the union is composed and 2)
the greater the share of intra-area trade in the countries' total trade, the
greater will be the scope for trade creation as opposed to trade diversion
(Lundahl and Petersson, 1991, 172).
When one fits SADC into the above generalisations it is apparent that there
can be both trade-creation and trade diversion effects in SADC. This is
because of the following points:
o SADC comprises 14 members and the size of the region has been
growing steadily over the years. Measures are underway to increase the
economic size of the region through infrastructural development policies,
the promotion, transfer and mastery of technology in the region and a host
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of others as outlines in the previous chapter. SADC, however, remains a
small region by international standards, even including South Africa. Also ,
South Africa and other SADC members still trade intensively with the
developed nations of the world . This works in the favour of trade-
diversion.
o The removal of obstacles on the free movement of capital and labour,
goods and services and the people will encourage or improve intra-area
trade in SADC. This will work in favour of trade creation effects. The
measures underway as outlined in chapter 1 should improve trade
between SADC members. However, intra-regional trade in SADC has
improved as was stated earlier on that it has improved from 12% to 22%
in the past few years .
The above points strongly support the view that the trade-creation effects in
the region should be dominant in the near future.
2.2.2 Economies of scale.
Scale economies operate when the long-run average total cost falls as plant
size increases. Since the scale of an enterprise or the size of a plant reflects
the amount of investment made in the relatively fixed factors of production,
the plant and equipment which vary only in the long-run, economies of scale
are associated with the long-run average cost only (Tewari and Singh , 1996,
133). There are two types of economies of scale and those are internal
economies and external econom ies. Internal economies are unit cost
advantages to a firm resulting from a change in the size of the plant. External
economies arise from outside the firm. Regional integration enables the
countries concerned to gain economies of scale by ensuring access to larger
markets , leading to an increase in the demand for goods and serv ices , which
the members specialise on according to intra-region comparative advantage.
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Regional trading groups encourage specialisation by members in the
production of goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Also , the
elimination or fall of tariffs between member countries ensures easy access
to larger markets by firms in the region . This leads to high concentration of
production in each member country, increased output and realisation of
economies of scale in the long run.
Economies of scale could , therefore, result in large cost savings on projects
realised through regionally co-ordinated and initiated investments in physical ,
social and institutional infrastructure (Brummerhoff, 1998, 35). Regional
integration usually overcomes the obstacles of economic development such a
small market size, market distortions, inefficient production techniques and
barriers to the movement of productive factors, thereby resulting in efficiency
gains (Brummerhoff, 1998, 35).
The following issues also lie behind the formation of regional groups in
Southern Africa as noted by Brummerhoff, (1998, 35-36):
• Southern African countries aim at achieving self-sufficiency, but at the
same time they are confronted with attempts to industrialise and
modernise their economies. This is one of the main areas of concern in
SADC as outlined in its object ives .
• The large number of small countries competing with one another in
international markets reduces their bargaining power in such markets , and
by forming the regional groups among themselves, their bargaining power
is increased in the region. Many countries in the region are also
dependent on a narrow set of similar primary products which negatively
impact on their participation in world trade: and
• The facilitation and mobilisation of investments, both from local and
fore ign sources , will increase if a much broader and integrated market can
attract the interest of foreign investors.
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These are the challenges facing regional groups in Southern Africa.
2.3 Southern African regional groups.
This section gives a brief overview of the different regional groups present in
Southern Africa.
2.3.1 The Common Monetary Area (CMA)
A de facto customs union existed between South Africa , Botswana , Lesotho
and Swaziland since 1910. This union was formalised in 1974 as a Rand
Monetary Area (RMA) between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. in the
RMA agreement, members were ailowed to circulate their currencies along
with the South African Rand. The South African Rand is accepted as legal
tender in member states but as from April 1986, the Rand no longer
constituted legal tender in Swaziland but is still accepted as a means of
payment (Brummerhoff, 1998, 36). The agreement accommodated a free
movement of funds between member countries and ready access to the
South African market. The South African Reser.;e Bank (SARB) took the
responsibility for managing the Rand , gold and foreign exchange for the
union (Holden , 1998). CMA membership at the moment is comprised of South
Africa , Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. CMA members are also S,ADC
members.
South Afr ica dominates the CMA through its more established and stronger
economy (especially a stronger central Bank ). Since the South Afr ican Rand
circulates among the CMA members , these other countries are subject to
South Africa 's monetary policy that may work against them. South Africa
therefore pays compensation to other CMA members for their loss of
seignorage (surrendering the freedom to determine one's own monetary
policy independently). Seignorage is calculated by estimating the number of
Rands in circulation, which are estimated by the amount agreed to in the
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agreement in December 31 , 1973. The estimation assumes that interest had
been lost on two thirds of the Rands in circulation. These amounts are
corrected each year by 1.2% of the increase, or by 0.8% of the decrease of
the notes in circulation of the South African Reserve Bank and the coin
liabilities of the treasury. The CMA group is said to have been running quite
smoothly (besides the introduction of own currencies by other member states)
since its formation.
No restrictions apply to the transfer of funds to or from the area of any other
member. Institutions in the government, financial and business sectors of
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have the right of access to the South
African capital and money market. Each member is responsible for handling
foreign exchange transactions in accordance with policies adopted by the
CMA. Also, exchange controls remaining in South Africa are in agreement
with the provisions that still apply to other CMA countries, and members shall
permit the repatriation of notes and coins issued by them which may be in
circulation in another CMA country
2.3.1. The Cross-Border Initiative (Cal).
The CBI was formed at the Maastricht conference in July 1990 by certain
Eastern and Southern African countries in consultation with and funded by
the European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
the African Development Bank. The CBI aims to develop the regiona l market
economy, promote regional econom ic growth and regional econom ic
integration. It facilitates other regional organisations and concentrates mainly
on cross-border trade, investment and payments. There are 14 member
states in the CBI. Eight of these are members of SADC. These are Malawi ,
Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaz iland, Tanzan ia, Zambia , and
Zimbabwe. Other member countries are Burund i, Comoros , Kenya ,
Madagascar, Rwanda and Uganda. The second Ministerial meeting of the
CBI on March 1995 drew a road map for trade reform. This map incorporates:
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1) convergence to an external tariff structure with 2 to 3 non-zero rates and
an average trade weighted tariff of 15% with a maximum of 20 to 25 by 1998,
2) the elimination of tariffs on intra-regional trade by 1998, 3) aim for a
maximum, absolute margin of preference between imports from CBI countries
and non-COMESA countries of 15% by 1998, 4) harmonisation of definitions
of goods bearing similar tariffs and permitted NTBs, 5) adoption of simplified
rules of origin based on tariff headings and value-added rules (Holden , 199,
7).
2.3.3 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
SACU is the deepest form of integration in Southern Africa. It includes all
members of the CMA as well as Botswana. SACU was initialised in 1910
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when South Africa, Botswana , Lesotho and Swaziland entered into the first
formal agreement. On reaching their independence, Botswana , Lesotho and
Swaziland renegotiated the agreement for implementation in 1960. South
Africa administered Namibia as part of the customs union until its
independence in 1990. Namibia 's membership was then formalised in 1990
and thereafter SACU comprised of South Africa and the smaller four
countries known as the BLNS (Holden, 199 , 4). SA.CU adopted a common
external tariff structure and free movement of goods among SACU members
with neither duties nor quantitative restrictions between the members . Excise
taxes are harmonised between members and together with import tariffs form
part of the common revenue pool. The pool is administered by the South
African Reserve Bank and allocated to members according to a formula that
enhances the revenue share going to the smaller countries by 42%. The
enhancement factor compensates the smaller members for the disadvantage
of forming a customs union with South Africa which include loss of fiscal
discretion, increased prices which arose from quantitative restrictions and
polarisation of economic activities (Holden, 199, 5).
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2.3.4 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
Formerly known as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and
Southern Africa , COMESA aims to achieve a free trade area by the year 2000
with free movement of capital and finance in the region and common
investment procedures to promote cross-border, domestic and foreign
investment. COMESA also aims to eventually become a monetary union.
COMESA came into force on the e" of December 1994. COMESA currently
has 23 members who are: Angola, Burundi , Comoros, Djibouti , Eritrea ,
Ethiopia , Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi , Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Rwanda, Seyche lles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland , Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
There are four obstacles which stand on the way of achieving the above
stated objectives of the region (The Economist intelligence Unit , 1996-97) .
Those obstacles are:
2.3.4.1 The nature of the relationship between COMESA and SADC is
unclear. There is high overlap of membership between SADC and COMESA.
SADC members proposed that COMESA be divided into two, with SADC
members forming the Southern part of COMESA. The other members in
COMESA did not welcome the proposal ; as a result, the relationship between
SADC and the COMESA has since become very sour. A joint summit has
been proposed to work on the over lap between SADC and COMESA.
2.3.4.2 Civil strives in Burundi, Rwanda , Somalia and Sudan deferred
regional integration. Also, the commitment to COMESA by the member states
is fragile since very little has been contributed by members. Total
membership contributions amounted to $4.6 million for the first half of 1994
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996-97).
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2.3.4.3 The strict "rules of origin" in COMESA are another constraint to full
integration in the region . There have been very strong arguments against the
"rules of origin" which stipulate that preferential treatment is given only to
goods produced by companies from member countries that have 51 % of their
equity held by citizens of the member states. Those at the forefront of the
arguments are Kenya and Zimbabwe. Also , many members have not
complied with the tariff reductions of the PTA.
2.3.4.4 The Trade and Development Bank of the region has been charged
with mismanagement to the extent that international auditors called for reform
in the Bank. The Bank was established in 1986 and became operational in
1986. The Bank is responsible for administering the PTA's monetary unit of
account (UAPTA) traveller's cheques. The UAPTA is equivalent to the
Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The UAPTA is used by the members to settle
debts between themselves in every two months with the balance payable in
dollars (EIU, 1996-97).
South Africa and Botswana are not members of COMESA even though South
Africa was invited to join in 1995. COMESA covers eight SADC members who
are Angola , Lesotho, Malawi , Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia , Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
It is evident from the above description and in the table below that there exist
co-membership in SADC and other groups. The objectives of these regional
groups may act a stumbling blocks to the establishment of more solid co-
operation in SADC rather than as a building bloc for economic co-operation
and development. These arrangements create the potential for complicating
the control of goods across national boundaries. In the table , Namibia and
Swaziland are the two countries that are members to all five regional groups.
They therefore pose a threat to the control of the movement of goods across
national boundaries since they are members of SACU, CMA and COMESA
that comprise slightly different membership conditions and each regional
group does not adopt the same common external tariffs to non-members.
Table 2.1 Membership of regional groupings
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Kenya I X X
Lesotho X X X X
Madagascar X X I
Malawi X IX X
Mauritius I I X T X X
Mozambique X X
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I I X X II
I I
Zaire I I I , XI
Zambia I X Tx I X II
Zimbabwe I I X l x IXI
Whether these regional groups are harmful or not to the economies of the
member countries is another story and extends beyond the scope of this
research. At the crux of their formation is the objective of improving the well
being, economic development and growth of their members. As most of them
are moving towards being free trade zones , especially COMESA that aims to
achieve free trade between members by the year 2000, the effects of free
trade zones to the well being of member count ries should be scrutinised.
Krugman (1991) as referred to by Wyoming (1991, xix) stated that free trade
zones are bad in theory but are good in practice. They are bad in theory
since they potentially divert trade from low-cost to high-cost suppliers,
therefore harming non-member countries by reducing the demand for their
exports and reducing the relative prices of their exports. Free trade zones
then reduce non-member country welfare. However, in practice free trade
zones are good since they increase the size of the markets. Larger markets
result in greater productive efficiency and competitiveness (Wyoming, 1991,
xix). Free trade zones may be good in practice especially where countries
trade more with their neighbours than with distant countries because
transporting goods and services and communicating over long distances is
costly. This argument would favour the formation of a free trade zone in
SACU, CMA, COMESA and SADC since member countries in these regions
are geographically close to each other . In contrast to Krugman's idea of free
trade zones being good in pract ice and bad in theory, Fred Bergsten (1991)
as cited in Wyoming (1991, xx) is of the view that free trade zones are bad in
both theory and practice. He argues that free trade zones should not be
viewed as a replacement for globa lism. If they are to happen, they should
move in the context of an effect ive and credible global trade system by
expanding GAD (which is now the World Trade Organisation (WTO)). With
technological advancement, transportation and communication costs are now
no longer central to trading partners (Wyoming, 1991, xx), and therefore the
benefits brought by these are not that huge suggesting that Bergsten's view
is more likely to prevail. In SADC, however transportation and commun ication
costs are still fairly central and the improvement in these is thus expected to
bring some benefits to the region.
2.4 Convergence in SADC, SACU and the CMA
Africa has a problem of setting up regional initiatives with sufficient benefits
for members and penalties for non-compliance to ensure continuing co-
operation. SACU and the CMA regional groups have proved to be successful
in ensuring a workable regional framework compared to SAOC. SACU and
CMA countries are , for one , geographically closer to each other. There has
been observed convergence of GOP per capita among SACU members than
among SAOC members. Jenkins and Thomas (1998) show that there is no
evidence of convergence between SAOC members in the period 1960 to
1990. In terms of macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and GOP per
capita , there has been convergence of policy between Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius as shown in the table below:















































































Source: International Financial Statistics
For SAOC as a whole there is little or no convergence. Convergence in
macroeconomic policy is one of the most important determinants of the
potential for a region to form a monetary union. This issue is taken further in
the following chapter where the theory on monetary unions is presented and
thereafter, SADC is assessed as to whether it forms an optimum currency
area or not.
This chapter has given the evidence of the multiple membership of SADC
members. Multiple membership may conflict with or complement the policies
that SADC implements. The move towards a free trade area has brought
about an intense discussion on the rules of origin. This proves that multiple
membership is a problem. Though theory highlights the economies of scale
and the trade-creation effects as the benefits of regionally integrating, it is
another exercise to determine whether these are still dominant or not when
members of a region are members in other regions vvh ich have different
policies and objectives. The C81, for an example, is converging its external
tar iff structure . The implications of this move to SADC are unknown and
determining such implications extends beyond the scope of this project.
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3. Theory of monetary unions
The most significant development in monetary unions recently has been the
formation of the European Union . The collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate system saw a movement towards more flexible exchange rate
arrangements in many countries. Though not going back to the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates , the European Unions ' Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) has formed the Euro as a new currency to which the
union's member countries currencies should be pegged. The story of the
EMU started in February 1992, when the European councils signed the
Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty serves as a benchmark in the evolution of
global trade and investment activ ities since it involve the creation of an
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) with one currency (the EURO) ; a common
European Central Bank (ECB); common monetary policy by the Year 1999;
and officially changed the European Economic Community (EEC) to the
European Community (EC) (Rehman, 1998, 51-52).
The Euro was introduced at the beginning of 1999 on a non-cash basis.
Between 1999 and 2002 , the Euro will function as the 16th parallel EU
currency . The Euro will replace national currenc ies of the EU member
countries by July 2002. The EMU is one example of a monetary union as
described in chapter 2. In this chapter, more emphasis is given on
elaborating what monetary unions imply, their costs and benefits and the
factors determining the format ion of monetary unions.
3.1 Theoretical background on monetary unions
A monetary union is a form of regional economic integration as in an area
with a single currency controlled by a single central bank (Corden, 1994,
125). It is full monetary integration of an area imposing a fixed relationship
between currencies and leads to a permanent absence of exchange controls
5 The European Council consisted of heads of the states of 12 nations.
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with respect to both current and capital account transact ions with in the area
(Lundahl and Peterson , 271 , 1991 ). A monetary union leads to the unification
of certain economic policy instruments, espec ially monetary pol icy where,
usually , a dominant country in the union with a strong currency sets monetary
policy for the union as a whole like , for example, Germany in the EMU.
Regional economic integration, as in a monetary union, does not necessarily
offer green pastures to the countries involved in the region but both benefits
and losses exist from participating in such arrangements. Consensus in
research has not yet been reached on the conditions under which policy co-
ordination may be optimal for a group of countries (Jenkins and Thomas,
1998). Most of the research on monetary unions has been based on
developed countries rather than developing countries because there hasn 't
been any significant unification of monetary policy among members of the
regions formed in developing countries. Therefore, more research still has to
be done for developing countries on regional economic integration and
monetary integration. Hallwood and Macdonald (1994, 276-279) give the
following as benefits and costs to forming a currency area , with the emphasis
on the European monetary system:
3.1.1 Benefits of monetary unions:
Firstly , the formation of a currency area reduces and eliminates exchange
risk. Since the currencies of the member countr ies are pegged to a single
currency or a basket of currencies , investors are no longer exposed to the
I
risk of being caught up inl possession of a currency that has depreciated
against other currencies in 'tr e union. Subsequently, trade and investment is
\
stimulated between the members of the union (i.e. trade creat ion between
members). Also , in a fixed exchange rate regime (and in a pegged fate
regime) , the excess ive volatility which characterises flexible exchange rates
is eliminated (see Frankel and Meese, 1987, 11 7).
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Secondly , because of a fall in uncertainty about the exchange rate , risk-
adjusted interest rates fall and lead to increased capital formation , increased
investment and more employment in the economies. Dynamic welfare gains
are then realised by the economies participating in a monetary union.
/thirdly, adoption of a common currency eliminates overshooting of the
exchange rate and promotes economic stability. Exchange rate overshooting
has characterised floating exchange rates since 1973. Proving whether
exchange rate variability harms the economy in a formal setting has,
however, been difficult (Neumeyer, 1998 , 246) . Exchange rate overshooting
promotes instability and insecurity which may harm the credibility of the
currency of an economy .
j Fourthly, intra-area current account deficits can be financed with local
currencies as they are pegged to a single currency rather than financing in
another currency like the US dollar as it used to be in most of the European
economies. In that case, payments surpluses with the US had to be
accumulated first before currencies could be earned to finance deficits.
Fifthly, transaction costs of exchanging one currency of a member country
against another are eliminated. It, therefore become less expensive to transit
and makes it easier for the economies concerned to trade .
j
The sixth benefit involves the fact that there is belief that some less credible
members of a union may gain monetary credibility as a result of allowing their
monetary policy to be governed by a credible and independent body (like the
Euro-fed in the European Union). Counter to this is the question whether
greater independence of a nation's existing central bank would not ach ieve
the same end. However, for countries that are members of a monetary union
the uncertainty over the pol icy path that a member might take is eliminated
since monetary as well as fiscal poiicy are co-ordinated in a monetary union.
The seventh benefit is that opaqueness of pricing in different currencies gets
eliminated and as a result trade is promoted .
Lastly, if prices are sensitive to movements in the exchange rates , adoption
of a common currency reduces variability in relative prices. This would lead to
more stability in the goods and factor markets especially if they are highly
sensitive to changes in the prices of goods and services.
3.1.2 Costs of monetary unions:
Firstly , the exchange rate can no longer be used as a macroeconomic tool to
offset demand or supply shocks in the economy. Nor can it be used to reduce
pressure on the foreign exchange reserves by depreciating in the event of
capital flight; the event of increased demand for foreign goods and services;
a fall in exports ; or a fall in productivity in the traded goods sector, etc.
Secondly, a country with a very high level of inflation may have to undergo a
period of deflation with high real interest rates , unemployment and lower
economic growth when entering a monetary union.
Inflation is usually caused by demand expanding policies that increase output
and reduce unemployment in the economy. However inflation can also be
caused by the magnification of the budget deficits directly or indirectly by
intentionally or unintentionally spending more than revenue resulting in
continuous monetary expansion, an increase in aggregate demand and a rise
in the general level of prices in the economy. Authorities receive revenue
from the inflation tax referred to as seignorage by doing this exercise. This is
because monetary expansion results in more revenue to the government
through tax since tax is a percentage of the amount of money accruing to
individual stakeholders in the economy that are taxed. The ability o~n
e_conQmY_lq.e.qrrLselgllQ.~age is lost in a monetary union.~Dg§ Jb~ .~QPnQDJY
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cannot ..j nd~pendent ly manipulate fiscal and .. monetary policy. For example,
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South Africa pays compensation to CMA members and these are Lesotho
Swaziland and Namibia for their loss of seignorage.
Thirdly , low-income countries may attract mainly low value added/ or low
wage direct foreign investment whereas high-income countries will attract
high value added/ or high wage investments in a monetary union . This comes
from the theory of the center and the periphery. The high- income country is
the center and the low-income country is the periphery. As a result , there may
have to be compensatory payments made by the center to the periphery.
Fourthly , monetary policy in the union may not suit all members and fiscal
policy of member countries is constrained. This point will be taken further
later in the paper.
Lastly, a currency union or a fixed exchange rate makes the real payoffs of
assets denominated in different currencies equivalent while reducing, also , vi'
the number of financial instruments with which economic agents can share! ".'
risks (Neumeyer, 1998, 247).
Forming a monetary union involves assessing the trade-off between the
benefits of reducing "excessive" exchange rate risk and the costs of reducing
the number of assets in the economy (Neumeyer, 1998, 246). Countries are
characterised differently and therefore face different kinds of constraints and
benefits from entering a monetary union. There is, however, consensus in
theory that wage and price flexibility; capital mobility between sectors of the
economies in the region and openness of the economies in the region ail
contribute positively to the co-ordination of exchange rate policy .
One would question whether co-ordination of exchange rate policy in SADC
will be wise. This is in the light of the fact that most of the members
experience low degrees of capital mobility between the traded goods sector
and the non-traded goods sector; economies of the members are not yet very
open and still use a lot of trade barriers; and prices and wages are not
flexible enough since a fall in wages may not be politically favourable in these
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countries. There is consensus in economic theory that fixed exchange rates
are less appropriate for countries which are dependent on the inflation tax;
without factor mobility; and subject to rigidities mainly in the factor markets so
that shocks take years to work through the economy; and where shocks for
core and peripheral countries are asymmetric (Jenkins and Thomas, 1996 ).
By participating in a monetary union, countries peg their currencies to either
a basket of currencies, as in the EMU's Euro , or to a single currency. In the
former, each country is assigned a weight in a basket of currencies. The
Deutchmark has the highest weight in the Euro . Deciding whether to join or
not to join a union is a decision to be based mainly on what is optimal for the
economies concerned .
Given the above, we can now isolate the factors that are the critical in
determining whether to peg an exchange rate or to float. These factors are
considered next.
3.2 Factors that determine the formation of a monetary
union.
The decis ion whether to peg or float the exchange rate and subsequently to
join or not to join a monetary union is based on what is opt imal for that
economy as indicated above. For an example, England did not join the EMU
since it had inflation problems and it was therefore not optimal for the country
to peg its currency to the EURO by joining the monetary union. Holden,
Holden and Suss (1979) in their study of annual data from 1974 to 1975 give
six factors that affect the choice of exchange rate policy. These factors are:
the openness of an economy (01); cap ital mobility (CM); the diversification of
the external sector (PC); the geographical concentration of trade (GC); the
degree of economic development (PCGDP); and the divergence between
rates of inflation (10). These factors are discussed below.
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3.2.1 Openness of the economy
In an open economy, i.e. an economy that trades a lot with other countries, it
is best to have a pegged or fixed exchange rate. The country can be a
member of a monetary union in this regard. Openness here is measured by
the contribution of the foreign sector to the country 's GOP. The higher the
contribution of exports and imports to GOP, the higher the level of openness.
The intuition behind this is that the more open an economy, the lesser the
exchange rate illusion and given that a trade-off between inflation and
unemployment exists, the trade-off will exist more between domestic
unemployment and the rate of change of prices expressed in foreign currency
(Holden et ai, 1979). Openness is negatively related to exchange rate
flexibility. Mckinnon (1963 , as cited in Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994)
suggests that in an open economy, changes in the exchange rate would not
alter the ratio of prices between traded (PT) and non-traded goods (PNT) , i.e.
d(PT/PNT)/dS =0 where S is the exchange rate. The exchange rate in an open
economy may as well be fixed , and therefore the country becoming a member
of a currency area or a monetary union.
Given the size and degree of diversification of the economy, it has been
shown that as openness increases, the greater must be the change in the
exchange rate to produce the changes in the balance of trade that are likely
to be desired (Tower & Willet, 1976, 40 as cited by Holden et.ai. 1979).
It is worthwhile for an economy to encourage more trade with its most
important trading partners . Openness of an economy to its trading partners is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for co-ordinating exchange rate
policy. Intensified trade between trading partners results when they form a
monetary union because the co-ordination of exchange rate policy results in
benefits in the form of the elimination of transaction costs, exchange rate risk
and opaqueness in the prices of goods.
3.2.2 Capital Mobility
It is difficult to generalise about the effect of capital mobility on a fixed against
a flexible exchange rate indicated by Holden et al. (1979). Mundell and
Fleming (1963, as cited in Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994) gave a model of
fixed versus floating exchange rates and introduced capital mobility into the
model. The model showed that if capital is highly mobile under flexible rates ,
the trade account will have to adjust to capital flows , causing domestic
resource allocation costs. Under fixed exchange rates on the other hand ,
high capital mobility eliminates domestic monetary independence (Holden,
Holden and Suss, 1979). When the level of capital outflow from an economy
is significantly high, the reserves are drained, in a fixed exchange rate
regime. When the level of capital outflow is high in a flexible exchange rate
regime, the currency depreciates. Capital mobility is an important determinant
for the success of a monetary union. Krause (1973) argues that high levels of
capital mobility within a region improves economic welfare, and is essential
for effective economic and monetary union . There are a number of factors
that determine the mobility of capital between countries . In general , capital
mobility is shaped by the rate of return and the risk attached to the
investment, as is evident from the writings of Folkerts-Landau (1991),
Lizondo (1991), Rojao-Suarez (1 991), Goldstein, Matheison and Lane
(1991), Meltzer and Brunner (1986) and Kasekende , Kitabire and Martin
(1998).
3.2.3 Diversification of the external sector (PC)
For a given degree of economic openness, the more diversified the external
sector, the more are the external disturbances likely to cancel out (Holden,
Holden and Suss, 1979). The external sector is diversified when a country's
total exports are not concentrated on a single export. The external sector is
concentrated when a large proportion of exports is accounted for by a single
export. Therefore, a country with a diversified external sector can adopt a
-1- 3
fixed exchange rate and a country with a concentrated external sector will be
at a disadvantage with a fixed exchange rate and thus should adopt a flexible
exchange rate. Product diversification of exports is negatively related ,
therefore, to exchange rate flexibility while product concentration (PC) is
positively related to exchange rate flexib ility since the external disturbances
cannot cancel each other out.
3.2.4 Geographical concentration of trade (GC)
Countries usually peg their currency against their largest trading partner.
Empirical evidence points to the fact that many developing countries do peg
to a currency of their important trading partner or peg to a basket of
currencies for countries with which most trade is done. Geographic
concentration of trade would therefore be expected to be negatively related to
exchange rate flexibility, implying that these countries would operate under
pegged exchange rate policy.
3.2.5 Degree of economic development (PCGDP)
In order for an economy to develop, it needs to grow. Economic growth is,
therefore the main criterion for deve lopment. Economic growth is measured
by the growth of total output or total income. In order to transfer growth into
development, one considers the total product of an economy given the level
of population in that economy (Cypher and Dietz, 1997). Generally less
developed economies with less developed goods and factor markets rely
more on imports . This is because import demand elasticities for these
economies are low since domestic substitutes of imports are not ava ilable
(Holden, Holden and Suss). Less developed countries tend to peg, therefore
against developed countries (i.e. the countries they trade the most with ). The
degree of economic development would be expected to be positively related
to exchange rate flexibility and negatively related to exchange rate fixation.
3.2.6 Divergence between rates of inflation (10)
There is strong belief that countries that have significantly different inflation
rates from their trading partners need to adjust their exchange rates
frequently . However, the direction of causality between the flexibility of the
exchange rate and the inflation differential may also run in the opposite
direction so that adopting a flexible exchange rate policy provide the policy
makers with the option of continuously inflating the domestic currency
(Holden, Holden and Suss, 1979). The core of the argument is that the
greater the difference between inflation rates of two countries , the wiser is the
decision not to peg their currencies against each other .
3.3 Macroeconomic policy implications
Some economists argue that price stability is the appropriate goal of
monetary policy, and fiscal discipline is the appropriate goal of fiscal policy.
There is consensus in Europe and other places that only by achieving price
stability can other goals of macroeconomic policy such as, high employment
and economic growth, be achieved over the long run (Wyoming, 1991, xxvii).
In transiting to a currency zone, Frenkel and Goldstein (1991) as mentioned
by Wyoming (1991, xxix) recommend that countries adopt a two-speed
approach where one sub-group of countries takes a fast approach , while the
other sub-group take a slow approach. Countries that take a fast approach
are those that have achieved low inflation rates and share other economic
characteristics and can move more quickly towards a currency zone.
Countries to take a slow-approach are those with disparate economic
performance and would move slowly toward a currency zone. The two-speed
approach would , therefore, preserve a momentum in the move to a currency
zone.
Corden (1994) on the other hand analyses four ways of moving from a
flexible exchange rate regime to a monetary union. The first one is what he
calls an all at once or step-by-step approach. In this approach, all countries
enter a monetary union at once with no gradual movements towards it. The
second approach is the gradual but concerted step-by-step approach.
Countries concerned move slowly together at a slow pace towards a
monetary union. The problem with this approach is that any country can drag
the process and the whole thing could take years . The third approach is the
gradual approach . In this approach, countries join when they are ready,
whether politically or economically. Therefore, a core group of countries that
are ready enter before others. The last approach is the parallel currency
approach. In this approach , a new currency is established in addition to
existing currencies but without fixed parities. The currency would maintain
either constant purchasing power or not be devalued relative to any other
currency. This approach was proposed in the 1970's by a group of academics
and by Britain in the 1990's as an alternative to the EMU. This was dismissed
by all the EC countries but Britain (Corden, 1994).
Frankel and Goldstein 's two-speed approach and Corden 's gradual approach
are more realistic. Countr ies that are ready should enter first and gradually ,
other countries enter too when their inflat ion rates and other macroeconomic
criteria such as their debt to GOP ratios, budget deficits , openness and
capital mobility are checked.
3.3.1 Fiscal policy in a monetary union.
In a monetary union, since the exchange rate and the monetary instruments
of the economy are no longer available (which is given as one of the costs of
participating in a union above), there is often an increased need to use fiscal
policy. The use of fiscal policy is however restricted in a monetary union.
Hallwood and MacDonald (1994) give two arguments supporting these
restrictions with the focus on the European Community (EC). The first
argument is the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty set fiscal targets of budgetary
policy and therefore places restr ictions on fiscal policy (Eichengreen, 1998).
The target is that the government debt to GOP ratio must be less than 60%
and the budget deficit must not be greater than 3% of GOP. The government
debt to GOP ratio tends to the following level (MacDonald, 1994):
Government debt = budget deficit/GOP
GOP GOP growth rate
Appendix A shows the GOP growth levels as annual percentages in SAOC. It
is clear from the appendix that growth rates in SAOC from 1994 to 1997 have
on average been higher than 3%. Most SAOC members have GOP growth
rates above 3%. This is good for development in the region. It is not, however
assumed here that since the above equality is a precondition for join ing the
European Union it should also be a precondition for forming a monetary
union in SAOC. SAOC comprise countries with different characteristics and
different levels of development than those in the European Communi ty. The
above equality serves just a guideline and an illustration of one of the
conditions which could be used in assessing the eligibility of countries for a
monetary union.
When GOP is growing at 3% per annum and government debt-GOP equals
the maximum allowed 60%, the budget def icit will not be more than 1.8% of
GOP. In 1991, only France and Luxembourg met this target. For there to be
room for fiscal expansion , the government debt-GOP ratio must be less than
60%.
Before the EMU became operational , the Maastricht requirements stated
above, aiming at achieving bucqetary discipline were not utilised.
Governments increased expenditure instead of cutting it and they raised
taxes too (Melloan , 1997). However, the EMU members at present were able
to meet the criteria for joining the monetary union .
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The second argument is the increasing integration of commodity markets
within the EC. The EC laws on public sector tendering aim to prevent
governments from favouring their domestic contractors so that a rise in
government spending will not necessarily be on domestic goods and labour.
As a result , fiscal policy is effective only through (a) the direct use of
additional local labour on public works or (b) the ability to affect the level of
aggregate demand in the EC as a whole. The latter is ruled out by the
Maastricht Treaty (Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994, 295).
The Maastricht Treaty provided for the establishment of a European Central
Bank (ECB). It became operational on 1 January 1999. The Bundesbank, i.e.
the Central Bank in Germany retreated and become part of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB). Monetary policy decisions in the EMU are
determined in the ECB in Frankfurt. However, the Bundesbank remains
responsible for implementing monetary policy decis ions in Germany, which
are taken by the ECB. European banknotes and coins will start to circulate by
1 January 2002 and the Euro will become the sole legal tender in the EMU
(Bekx, 1998).
It has been noted that the formation of the EMU will result in certain trade
creation and trade divers ion effects. The trade creation effects would result
from the positive impact on the economic growth of the members of the EU
resulting from forming the union . The trade diversion effects would result from
increased comoetit iveness of the Euro area countries the overall imoact on, ' .
exports of non-EU countries being positive (8ekx, 1998).
Frenkel and Goldstein (1991), as cited by Wyoming (1991) give several
mechanisms for ensuring fiscal discipline in a currency zone: 1) the market
place itself. Excessive deficits by member countries that are not finance
through money creation will result in defic it premium on government debt.
The government will then be forced to improve fiscal policies in the face of
rising cost of government borrowing and reduced credit availability; 2) the
enactment of fiscal policy rules which will place an upper limit on the size of
budget deficits and government debt relative to the Gross National Product;
(3) peer-group multilateral surveillance. Constraints on national fiscal policies
would have to be more flexibly applied to discourage irresponsible fiscal
policies of member countries (Wyoming, 1991, xxix).
A combination of market discipline and peer-group surveillance will be
powerful in ensuring that members keep fiscal policies sound because of
market discipline and that countries are encouraged to solve pre-existing
fiscal problems especially before they enter currency zones because of peer-
group surveillance (Wyoming, 1991 J xxix).
Other than the government debt to GOP ratio and the government deficit, the
Maastricht Treaty also set out two other convergence criteria to determine
whether a member state of the European Union is eligible for the EMU. These
two criteria are extracted from Corden (1994):
• Firstly, for two years before entry, the country's exchange rate must have
stayed within the normal band of 2.25 percent and it must not have
devalued its bilatera l central rate against any other member state 's
currency for the same period.
• Secondly , its average rate of consumer price inflation must not have
exceeded by more than -1.5 percentage points the rate observed in the
three member countr ies with the best inflation performance over the year
before. Also, as an indicator of inflation convergence, the average long-
term interest rate shall not have exceeded by more than 2 percentage
points those of the same three best performing member states.
A monetary union, therefore , places constraints on both monetary and fiscal
policy . Countries that consider forming a monetary union must be well placed
with the above factors that have been found to determine the sustainability
and success of a monetary union .
Jenkins and Thomas (1998) give 3 factors that are critical in scrutinising the
readiness of a group of countries for macroeconomic policy co-ordination or
the formation of a monetary union . These factors are:
3.3.2 Spill over effects
As countries become more open to the world economy, monetary and fiscal
policy adopted in one country will spillover to other countries. The result ,
then, is sub-optimal equilibria when a policy adopted by one government in
maximising domestic objectives ignores external ities on other countries
(Jenkins and Thomas, 1998). Domestic fiscal policy changes , according to
Persson and Tabellin i (1995 , as referenced by Jenkins and Thomas, 1998)
are transferred to other countries (1) through changes in the terms of trade ;
(2) where capital is internationally mobile, through differences in the after-tax
return on international capital (3) and through changes in the demand for
imports. Monetary policy changes on the other hand are transmitted through
changes in interest rates and changes in the real exchange rate. These
externalities or inefficiencies decrease when countries co-operate (Jenkins
and Thomas , 1996). The above support the ear lier finding that the more
countries become open to the world economy or to other countries, the more
they should co-operate on macroeconomic policy by forming an optimum
currency area .
3.3.3 Beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations
There is a desire to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations in pursuit of
high employment. Beggar-thy-neighbour deva luations refer to a situation
where a country intentionally devalues its currency in order to gain
compet itiveness so as to improve the level of exports and as a result, improve
employment levels in the economy. In a pegged exchange rate this tool is no
longer available to policy makers in an economy. A country has to consider
50
the costs and benefits of a fixed exchange rate or, at the extreme, a currency
union.
3.4 Convergence in macroeconomic indicators
There is the theoretical prediction that poorer countr ies should catch up with
or converge to rich ones in terms of GOP per capita because , for example,
they can take advantage of existing technology without developing it. This
prediction is weakly supported in groups of countries that are co-operating
(Jenkins and Thomas , 1998) . There is mixed evidence as to whether
convergence in GOP per capita or convergence in macroeconomic stability
indicators between rich and poor countries is really occurring. It is also
apparent from the previous chapter that GOP per capita among SADC
members has not converged. For example , there is lack of consensus on
whether or not exchange rate co-ordination has helped in fostering
convergence in macroeconomic stability indicators among EU members and
lack of consensus on whether or not monetary integration in Europe is good
or bad (Jenkins and Thomas, 1998).
Deciding whether to join or not to join a monetary union is a very tough
decision, let alone trying to meet the criteria for joining. There is also a puzz le
in choosing the right time and stage that is suitable for a country to join a
currency union. There is consensus in theory that trade liberalisation has to
be achieved first so that economies can be open first. One, therefore,
wonders if it is not premature for SADC members to form an optimum
currency area and co-ordinate macroeconomic policy. Another critical aspect
is whether or not it is correct to compare deve loped country studies of Europe
to the developing countries of Southern Afr ica.
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3.5 Will the formation of an optimum currency area by SADC
members be premature?
Giving an answer to this question is not easy. A lot of factors are at stake
here regarding the well being of SADC member countries . It has to be
emphasised that in a currency union, countries cannot devalue or revalue on
their own and they cannot control the quantity of money on their own. There
are constraints on monetary and fiscal policy. Many researchers have,
therefore suggested that formation of a monetary union by SADC members
will be premature and disastrous. For example, Jenkins and Thomas (1998)
say that there is no a priori expectation of convergence among SADC
members in terms of forming an optimum currency area because these
countries are agricultural and mineral exporters; respond asymmetrically to
external price shocks, so that these countries cannot survive under single
monetary and fiscal policy; and their debt levels are very high. Reducing the
debt levels will not only reduce the debt to GDP ratio but will, most
importantly, save lives of many Africans. The following table is an extract
from a table given by Jenkins and Thomas (1998) on SAOC performance and
policy stance.
Table 3.1 SADC's performance and policy stance.
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Variable SADC average SADC range
(1990-94) (1994)
Average GOP growth rates (%) +2 .5 -10.7 to +17 .5
Average inflation rates (%) 28 .8 7.3 to 52.5
Average debt to GOP (1993, %) 121.8 13.4 to 450.3
Average investment to GOP (%) 31.2 9.2 to 85.8
Average savings to GOP (%) 11.4 -13.7 to +44.4
Aid greater than 20% of imports Five 1.2 to 113.4%
Aid withheld for non-compliance Three -
Aid withhe ld for political pressure Three -
Cautious fiscal stance (no slippages) eight I -
Under pressure from IMFlWorld Bank seven -
on fiscal policy
Average deficit-to GOP ratio (1990-93, -6.1 -22.2 to -0.2
%) I
Monetary stance: tight six -
Monetary stance: loose/inactive six -
Average lending rates positive (1993) eight -26.2 to +8.7
Central bank operational independence thre e -
on monetary policy
Dominant external influence !MFlWorld six -
B on monetary policy




Regular over-valuation occurs four -
Exchange control regime free two I -
Exchange contro l regime liberal nine -
Degree of financial Iiberalisat ion: five -
modest-high
Government ownership of commercial seven -
banks
Openness : exports + imports/GOP (%) 96.1 45.5 to 155.3
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Table 3.1: Continued




Trade regime liberal ten -
Broadly politically democratic I four -
Reports of corruption eleven -
Corruption against which action taken two -
Potential for political instability six -
Potential for economic instability in the four -
medium term
Source: Jenkins and Thomas (1998, 18).
The study by Jenkins and Thomas (1998) was conducted for the period of
1990 to 1994. The SADe countries are some of the highly indebted countries
in the world as is shown by the average debt to GOP ratio in the table above.
One of the potentially effective remedies for reducing the debt levels is for the
debt to be written off. As De Sarker (1998) wr ites , according to the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP ) if debt is written off today, it could
free up the potential of African children and save lives such that 21 million
children could be saved before year 2000 in Africa's most indebted nations.
Economists, however, do not yet have a fully sat isfactory theory of debt
finance (Hart and Moore, 1998 , 1), therefore the actual economic implications
of different types of debt remedies are not obv ious (see Roe (1992), Zha kata
(1992), DuZaire (1992), Yemidale (1992 ), M'Set (1992) , Seck ('1992) and The
Central Bank of Nigeria (1992)) .
One of the factors that exacerbate the debt problem is that average
investment in SADC as a whole is greater than savings. The impl ications of
this can be explained using the following accounting identity from Hallwood
and MacDonald (1994):
(X-M)-RF =(S-I) + (T-G)
5-+
Where X is exports, M are imports (X-M is the trade account), RF is the net
interest paid abroad, S is savings, I is investment, T is taxes and G is
government spending. Anything that causes I to rise relative to S, G relat ive
to T, M relative to X or RF to increase can cause net foreign indebtedness to
increase. Where net foreign indebtedness is the current account deficit that
has to be financed by borrowing from abroad (Hallwood and MacDonald,
1994). Most SADC countries have a debt to GOP ratio that is above the 60%
which is the maximum allowed debt-GOP ratio for countries in the European
Community to join the union. Debt, therefore still remains a burden for SADC
countries.
Krugman (1995) argues that 'debt overhang' is one of the problems which
make it difficult for the developing countries to repay their debts. Debt
overhang is described as a situation where a country's expected present
value of potential future resource transfers is less than its debt. An
exhaustive model of debt overhang can be found in Krugman (1995).
Krugman (1995) scrutinises ways in which the debt overhang can be dea lt
with.
Southern Africa is not the only region that has been severely affected by the
debt burden. Southern Africa, when compared to other developing countries
like Bolivia , Chile and Brazil have better debt levels. The following table
compares the indebtedness of the developing world 's most indebted nat ions
in the 1980's.
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Table 3.2: Comparative indebtedness, 1985 (interest on external debt as
a ratio of exports).
Southern and . Interest/export Developing InteresUexport
Eastern Africa Countries .
.'
1. Somalia 25% 1. Bolivia 43%
2. Madagascar 24% 2. Chile 43%
3. Tanzania 16% 3. Brazil 38%
4. Zambia 15% 4. Mexico 34%
5. Malawi 12% 5. Argentina 25%
, 6. Ecuador 25%
7. Costa Rica 24%
8. Uruguay 22%
9. Ivory Coast 18%
I I 10. Colombia 1 16%I
Source: Kwasa S.0. , The debt Problem of Eastern and Southern Afnca, 1989
The table shows that the external debt in Southern and Eastern Afr ica was
less severe than that of the six top Latin American countries (Mayo , 1991).
The picture hasn 't changed much since the 1980's since the high ly indebted
developing countries have difficulties in servicing the debt. A number of
countries have resorted to the following measures andlor actions because of
debt (Kwasa, 1989 , 439 ):
• Some debtor countries have sometimes decided not to repay their
external debt not because they do not have the resources to pay for it
but they just refuse to transfer foreign exchange to their credi tors in the
payment of the debt.
• Other debtors have been really unable to repay the external debt since
they had insufficient foreign exchange to serv ice it.
• Sometimes countries declared themselves unable to meet debt
obligations by reason of bankruptcy.
• Lastly, some count ries repudiate aid debtors when a new government
comes into power through strong nationalist pressures which emanated
from economic crises (Kwasa, 1989, 441) .
Latin America utilised the last two types of remedies and the first two were
utilised in Europe (Kwasa , 1989, 441). There are a number of other remedies
taken by creditor nations and financial institutions to remedy or to reduce the
debt problems of the African nations. These remedies include utilising 1) the
Multi-Year Rescheduling Agreement (MYRA's) where the debt payment date
is rescheduled to a later period when the debtor country will be in a better
position to repay the debt ; 2) Debt- Equity swaps; 3) and many commercial
banks have made provisions . against bad debts. The American Bank,
Citicorp, was the first to make provis ion against non payment of US$2.5biilion
by Latin American States in May 1987. The bank acknowledged that a
quarter of its Latin American debts of US$15billion was never going to be
paid. Another bank to provide against non-payment was a U.S. bank called
Manufacturers Hanover. The bank provided against non-payment of
US$1 .7billion . Another bank was the Bank of England that made bad debt
provisions by 30% of total bad debts owed to it (Parfitt and Riley, 1989, 163).
The provision against bad debts does not necessarily mean the writ ing-off of
the debt, but it only makes a provis ion against the debt. This indicates that
there is awareness amongst creditors that much of the debt owed by
developing countries is unlikely to be paid (Parfitt and Riley , 1989, 164).
3.6 What is the source of Southern African debt?
In order to remedy the external debt one has to look at the sources of the
problem. The debt problem of the Southern African economies emanates
from the economic crisis in the 1980's . Domestic food oroduction in the,
African states have been declin ing and food imports rising because there
have been a lot of disasters such as drought and famine. Also , recessions in
the western countries in the 1980's that mainly emanated from the oil price
shocks of the 1970's led to a decline in the demand for the primary product
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exports from Africa. Values of primary exports have decreased over the years
making it difficult for most African countries to gain enough foreign exchange
to pay for imports , leading to a fall in GOP and the inability to replace the
infrastructure (Parfitt and Riley, 1989, 18-19) .
Three decades ago, the underdeveloped countries of Asia , Africa and Latin
America were considered as "Third World" countries , but today the city states
of Hong-Kong and Singapore are already classified as high-income countries
and if current growth rates persist, per capita income levels in Taiwan could
overtake those in Belgium , Italy and elsewhere in Europe by the end of the
century (Lindauer and Roemer, 1994, 1). In their post independence, most
African countries (including SAOC members) have experienced external
shocks, poor policy responses and ineffective development strategies that
brought about stagnation (Lindauer and Roemer, 1994, 1-2 and The World
Bank, 1989). The table above illustrates that eleven SAOC countries in 1990
to 1994 had reports of corruption and in such an environment, policy co-
ordination is not possible. Additionally, Angola and Mozambique do not yet
have liberal trade regimes. Also , some of SAOC member countries rely
heavily on foreign aid and most members are under pressure from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (W B) regarding their
monetary and fiscal policies. The African continent is par excellence one of
extreme vulnerabiiity to foreign interference (Amin, 1990, 115). Some
economists believe that availability of external finance decrease the chances
of radical stabilisation (Treisman, 1998, 242).
There are rigidities in prices and wages and these rigidities are biased
upwards. Additionally, capital is immobile between the traded and the non-
traded goods sectors in most SAOC countries. SAOC members are also in
the process of reforming trade between themselves and opening their
economies to world trade. Until most of the above factors are addressed,
there is no expectation of convergence of exchange rate policy among SAOC
members. It has been shown in the trade literature that most fixed exchange
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rates can break down because of adverse macroeconomic shocks and self-
fulfilling speculat ion (Jeane, 1997, 265).
If the above is addressed and a currency union formed in SADC, there will
still remain the d h currency problem that which currency should be used as a
numeraire against which others will peg (Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994,
281). Possibly the South African Rand since it is a numeraire in the CMA
against which other CMA members peg, or else another country's stronger
currency or a currency basket as in the Euro. It is not possible to say, at the
moment, which numeraire will be best for the region. This area remains a
good avenue for further research.
This chapter has analysed the motivations for monetary unions , their effects
and the factors that determine their success. SADC was then scrutin ised and
will continue to be scrutinised further in the next chapter against the factors
that determine the success of a monetary union .
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4. The Model
In order to ascertain whether SADC forms an optimum currency area , the
model developed by Holden , Holden and Suss (from now on referred to as
Holden et.al. (1979)) is adapted to this purpose. The model tests whether
openness, capital mobility, the diversification of the external sector,
geographical concentration of trade, the degree of economic development
and the divergence between inflation rates do explain the fixation of an
exchange rate or not. Holden et. al. run their model for a sample of 75
countries , for the period 1974-1975. The model produced very good results,
which will be given later in this chapter. These results will then be compared
with the results retrieved from running the same model, but for the later
periods, i.e. 1984/85 and 1994/95. This study concentrates mainly on the
later periods.
4.1 The hypothesis
The testable hypothesis is that members of SADC form an optimum currency
area in terms of the exchange rate arrangements between them . This will
determine whether SADC should form a monetary union or not, or whether
the characteristics demonstrated by the SADC countries suggest the
existence of a monetary union. The model developed by Holden , et.al is used
to test this hypothesis. The model is given below.
4.2 The Model
The present study runs the Holden, et. al model for a sample of 75 countries,
chosen by the availability of data , for two different periods , i.e. 1984-1985
and 1994-1995. Therefore a 10-year period has been allowed between the 3
different periods . This allows for comparisons between the three different
time periods, especially the two time periods that this study focuses on. The
model compares SADC and the EMU. The aim is to use the model to
60
establish the significance of an optimum currency area in SADC and the
EMU. One would expect the EMU to form an optimum currency area in the
1990's since it is during this per iod (1994/1995) that the EC members were
close to full monetary integration, with the Euro circulating parallel to the
member countries ' currencies.
Drawing from optimum currency area literature, the following model is used to
test the above hypothesis:
Fi =f31 + f32 01 + f33 PC + f34 10 + ~5 PCGDP + f36 GC + f3 7 CM
Where:




PCGDP =Degree of Economic Development
GC =Geographical Concentration of Trade
CM = Capital Mobility
This is the model extracted from Holden, et.al In the present study , this
model is run for the two time periods individually, i.e. for the 80's and the 90's
periods. The individual regressions incorporate the dummy variab les for
SADC and the EMU. Therefore, the model that is run for the time periods is:
Fi = 131 + 132 01 + 133 PC + 134 ID + 135 PCGDP + 136 GC + 137 CM + 138 SADC +
~9 EMU
Therefore, in addition to the original variables in the model the dummies are :
SADC = A dummy variable for SADC countries.
EMC = A dummy variable for the European Monetary Union countries.
A thorough explanation of the dependent and explanatory variables In the
model and their expected signs is given below.
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4.2.1 Fj : The flexibility index: the dependent variable.
F, is the flexibility index. This is the ratio of the sum of the absolute value of
end-of-month percentage changes in the trade-weighted exchange rate to the
sum of absolute changes in official holdings of foreign exchange. Holdings of
foreign exchange would be the total reserve holdings of the country minus the
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) holdings and the reserve pos ition in the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Flexibility Index is therefore
calculated as:
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Where
i =1...n represents country numbers.
Et =an index of the trade-weighted exchange rate of country j at time t,
Rl = U.S. dollar value of country Fs holdings of foreign exchange at time t,
Xl =U.S. dollar value of exports of country j in month t, and
It = U.S. dollar value of imports of country j in month t.
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>' = This is the sum of monthly values over 11 months since January is used
1=0 as the base month.
') ~_.,
L: = The sum of monthly values over a period of two years. This is over 23
k=0
months since January of the first year is used as the base month.
This index indicates the flexibi lity of exchange rate policy. It reflects reserve
~-------------------------~- -----
and exchange rate movements. Exchange rate movements are in the
numerator and reserve changes in the denominator. The calculation used a
24-month sum to eliminate the effects of short-run fluctuations in either
reserves or exchange rates that do not reflect long run exchange rate policy
accurately. Months are the shortest period for which data can be found . The
index is dimensionless because the denominator is the ratio between reserve
changes and trade. The flexibil ity index, therefore assume values ranging
from infinity (for an intervention free exchange rate policy) to zero (a pegged
rate) (Holden, Holden and Suss, 1979). Infinity would mean that there has
been no change in the reserves of a country. The country adopts a highly
flexible exchange rate policy without intervention by the authorities in the
movements of the exchange rate. The determination of the exchange rate is,
therefore left to the market forces. The flexibility index indicates that if the
absolute value changes in reserves (Ii1RI) are high in relat ion to the absolute
value changes in the trade weighted exchange rate, the authorities are
intervening heavily to offset market forces (Holden et al. 1979, 328). A high Fi
figure indicates that there is less intervention in the exchange rate market by
the authorities. A low Fi figure would then indicate that intervention in the
exchange rate market by the authorities in great. Absolute values are used in
the index in order to capture the sum of the changes in reserves and the
exchange rate. This would , in the case of the changes in reserves , indicate
the amount of intervention in the exchange rate market by the authorities .
The flexibility index is calculated for a sample of countries that appear in the
appendix for 24 months in the two time periods, i.e. 1984-85 and 1994-95.
4.2.2 01: Openness of the economy: Explanatory variable
This is the ratio of imports and exports to gross domestic product. This is
calculated as:
01 =X + M- !__1
GDPi
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Xi represents the exports of country i. The i refers to all the countries in the
sample. Mi represents the import of country i. GOPi is the Gross Domestic
Product for each country in the sample. This formula is carried out for each
country in the sample in turn. it was performed for two-time periods i.e.
1984/85 and 1994/95 and averaged out over the two years in each period.
Openness is negatively related to exchange rate flexibility . Therefore the
more open an economy the less flexible is its exchange rate policy. This
means that more open economies tend to intervene more in the exchange
rate market since a great deal of trade is undertaken outside the country.
4.2.3 CM: Capital mobility: Explanatory variable
This is the ratio of gross private capital flows to gross domestic product. This
is calculated as:
CM = GPCF j
GDPi
GPCFi are the gross private capital flows of country i. The calculation was
performed for each country and averaged over two years in each of the two
time periods in the study.
The best measure of capital mobility would be the ratio of gross international
capital flows to internal financial flows. However data on internal financial
flows is not available since it is considered an impossible task to record such
data and is therefore not recorded in financial statistics. GOP is, therefore,
used as a proxy although it is indicated by Holden et al. (1979, 329) that "the
use of GOP may produce a downward bias in capital market openness for
developing countries and an upward bias for developed countries" (Holden,
Holden and Suss, 1979). This is because GOP is higher for developed
countries and lower for developing countries . GOP overshadows the capital
flows that occur within the country. The data on the internal financial flows is
not available since it is difficult to determine. CM may, therefore be negatively
or positively related to the flexibility index . Vvhen it is positively related , it
suggests that countries , whose capital is high ly mobile, have tended to adopt
flexible exchange rates. When it is negative, it suggests that countries whose
capital is highly mobile have tended to adopt less flexible exchange rates. It
was stated earlier in chapter 3 that under fixed exchange rates, high capital
mobility leads to a drain of the reserves since the authorities want to mainta in
the value of the currency or the peg in other cases. In a flexible exchange
rate regime, high capital mobility contributes towards the depreciation of the
currency and less of a drain on the reserves. Therefore the sign of the CM
variable will indicate which of the above two scenarios have been dominant.
4.2.4 PC: Diversification of the external sector: Explanatory variable
This is the average annual .percentage of total exports accounted for by the
largest export in terms of the two-digits SITe (Standard International Trade
Classification) This in true fact is product concentration, an indirect measure
of the degree of diversification. The use of product concentration is
suggested by Adelman and Morris (1967) as noted in Holden, et.al (1979).
This variable is calculated as:
PD= LX * 100--!-
LXi is the value of the largest export of country i in terms of the Standard
International Trade Classification. LXi is the value of total exports of country i.
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4.2.5 GC: Geographical concentration of trade: Explanatory variable
This is the percentage of total exports accounted for by exports to the largest
market annually.
GC = XLi- * 100 J :j:: I
XLi is the value of exports of country i going to its largest market (or trading
partner). Xij is the total value of exports of country i which occur with country
j. The j refers to all the trading partners of country i. Countries whose trade is
concentrated in one or a few countries tend to peg to currencies of their most
important trading partners. These countries would intervene in the exchange
rate market to offset market forces in order to maintain the peg. Changes in
reserves for these countries tend to be high and their Fi would therefore be
very low.
4.2.6 PCGDP: Degree of economic development: Explanatory variable
This is calculated as the average annual per capita gross domestic product.
PCGOP = GDP j
Population,
GOPi is as explained above . Th is calculation was performed for all the
countries in the sample and averaged over a period of two years for each of
the two time periods in the sample. Less developed countries tend to have
high population levels and low GOP levels. This results in a low value of
PCGDP for a less developed economy and high PCGDP value for a
developed economy.
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4.2.7 ID: Divergence between rates of inflation: Explanatory variable
The inflation differential (10) is calculated as the average annual percentage
increases in consumer prices. Hoiden et.al. (1994) measure the 10 in the
following manner:
Where L\Pi is the inflation rate of country i; L\Pj is the inflation rate of country j
and aij is the proportion of country is total trade that occurs with country j.
The i refers to all the countries in the sample of the study and the j refers to
all the trading partners of each of the countries in the sample of the study,
This is how the inflation differential is determined in this study .
4.2.8 SADC: A dummy variable.
This variable takes the values of 1 for SAOC member countries and 0 for
non-members. If this variable is significant and negative, it suggests that
SAOC member countries intervene in the exchange rate market. If the
variable is significant 'and positive, it suggests that SADC intervenes less in
the exchange rate market. If it is sign ificant and positive, SADC members do
not form an optimum currency area.
4.2.9 European Monetary Union: A dummy variable.
It takes the value of 1 for EMU member countries and 0 for non-members. If
this variable is significant and negative, it suggests that EC member countries
form an optimum currency area. If it is sign ificant and positive, EC me'mbers
do not form an optimum currency area.
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4.2.10 YEAR: A dummy variable.
This dummy variable is there to control for the effect of time in the model. It is
there to control for the changes related to time for the periods of 1984 to
1985 against the period of 1994 to 1995.
4.3 Preliminary data examination
The raw data was calculated such that it is in constant millions of US dollars
(1995=100) to make it compatible. Data is extracted from the following
sources:
o The International Financial Statistics (IFS ). Data extracted from this
source is data on exports and imports , the GOP, private capital flows ,
population, and the inflation rates. This data is used to calculate the 01,
CM, PCGDP and the 10 variables.
o The Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Data extracted from this source
is data on the percentage of total exports accounted for by exports to the
largest market. This data is used to calculate the GC and the !D variables.
Calculating the 10 variable involved the exercise of extracting data from
the DOTS manually and transferring it into a spreadsheet. The exercise
involved taking data on imports and exports of all the trading partners for
the countries in the sample, and then determining the proportion of trade
that each country does with each of its trading partners.
o The Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. Data extracted from this
source is data on exports accounted for by the largest export in terms of
the two-digit SITC classification. This data is used to calculate the PO
variable.
The following problems were encountered with the data:
4.3.1 Not all data is readily available from the IFS and other sources for all
the countries in the sample . The nominal effective exchange rate
(NEER) used to calculate the flexib ility index is not available for some
countries in the sample . These countries are: Argenti na, Barbados,
Botswana, Chad, Egypt , India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya , Korea,
Madagascar, Mali , Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia , Nepal,
Peru, Seychelles, Sri Lanka , Swaziland, Tanzania, Tha iland and
Zimbabwe.
The NEER for the above countries is calculated using the formula below
extracted from Holden and Holden (1985):
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I aij Nij<t-k) ji





o E(t-k) IS the index of the trade-weighted exchange rate of a country
(NEER).
o aij is the proportion of country i's total trade that occurs with country j.
These are the weights. They are calculated for the base year whic h is
1995 in the sample, the same base year as with the NEER's for other
countries that were readily avai lable.
o Nij is the exchange rate between country i and its trading partner country j.
Therefore, at time t, the first month of the period, the index is set to 100. In
the second month, the index is determined as:
E(t-1 ) =
I aij Nij(t- l ) l
i=1
II
I a ij Nij(t)
i= I
x 100 where i :;t j
This formula is performed for each month of the data of each country until the
last month. The results are then transferred to the Fi calculation. Therefore,
calculating the NEER involves determining the trading partners of each
country in the sample and the proportion of trade between the country in
question and its trading partners. This serves as the weights in the
calculation. The weights are then multiplied by the exchange rate, i.e. the
country in question's currency relative to each of its trading partners, then
dividing this by the values .determined for the base month, where the base
month is:
11
Ejt = I a ij Nij(t)
i= I
Set to 100
4.3.2 The data for SACU members is not available at the individual country
level from the DOTS and the Yearbook of International Trade Statist ics in
order to calculate the 10 and PO variables respectively. The data is available
only at the regional level. Therefore, another source was consulted, i.e. the
Country Reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EiU).
4.4 Problems to be treated
There are two main econometric problems that have to be tested in the data
set. These are the endogeneity problem and the heteroscedasticity problem
since the data set used is cross-sectional in nature.
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4.4.1 The endogeneity problem:
Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the
residual. In . this case the 10 variable is the potential candidate. With the
problem of endogeneity, ordinary least squares is not suitable. An alternative
method of estimation is the method of instrumental variables (IV). An
instrumental variable is a variable that is correlated with the explanatory
variable (10) but not with the residual in the model. Finding an instrumental
variable for the inflation differential has proved to be very difficult. It is difficult
to find a variable that will be correlated to the inflation differential variable
without being correlated to the residual.
However, with thorough analysis of economic literature, it has been found
that the change in the money supply does determine the level of inflation in
an economy. The change in the level of money supply is found to be highly
correlated to the inflation differential. This will be illustrated in the next few
sections.
4.4.2 Heteroscedasticity:
The sample data in this study is cross-sectional in nature, there is, therefore
likely to be heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is when the variance of the
disturbance term (residual ) is not constant. OLS estimation in the presence of
heteroscedasticity produces linear, unbiased, but inefficient coefficient
estimators. Inefficiency implies that there is no minimum variance in the
estimators.
It will be clear when the results are analysed that heteroscedasticity exists in
the sample data of this study.
Therefore, the two main problems that have to be treated regarding the
sample data are the problems of endogeneity and heteroscedasticity.
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4.5 Data Analysis
This section presents the main inferences from the data by looking at the
values of the variables in the model. This sect ion looks at the minimum and
maximum values of the variables that have been calculated for the model , in
order for us to confirm the theory underlying the variables in the model.
From the data as a whole the following minimum and maximum values were


































It can be seen from the table above that Namibia had a pegged rate in the
period 1984/85, meaning that the authorities interfered in the exchange rate
market. Namibia is a member of the CMA where member's currencies are
pegged to the Rand. Therefore, the Namibian Dollar was pegged to the
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Rand. In the period 1994/95, Cameroon had a pegged exchange rate regime
where the authorities interfered in the exchange rate market. On the other
hand, Argentina has the highest value of the Flexibility Index in both time
periods . This means that during the two periods, the Argentinean authorities
did not intervene in the exchange rate market.
Uganda was the least open economy in the 1984/85 period and Congo in the
later period. These countries have not engaged in much trade. These
countries are mainly natural resource producers. On the other hand ,
Singapore in the earlier period and Lesotho in the later period are the most
open economies in the sample. Singapore trades with many economies in
goods and services and Lesotho trades mostly with South Africa. Lesotho is a
land-locked country, surrounded by South Africa. Moreover, Lesotho and
South Africa are members of SACU. When looking at the level of
diversification in the economy , Lesotho was relatively externally divers ified
with a value of 47.8 in the earlier period, but became one of the least
diversified economies in the later per iod with a value of 74.47.
In both time periods, the most externally diversified economies are Maur itius
and Kenya. Congo and Zamb ia are the least diversified econom ies in the
sample.
The least geographically concentrated economies are Hungary and Uruguay.
The most concentrated ones are Canada and Mexico , who both trade largely
with the United States . In the earl ier period, 72% of total trade in Canada was
with the United States and 74% in the later period. 59% of total trade in
Mexico in the earlier period was with the US and 78% in the later period.
.Mozambique is the least developed country in both time periods.
Mozambique is one of the poor countries in the wor ld. GOP per capita is very
small in the economy. Switzerland is the opposite. It is the one of the richest
economies in the world . GOP per capita is very high .
Divergent inflation rates were experienced mainly in Argentina and Congo
(the Democratic Republ ic) in the earlier and later periods respectively. In
these periods Argentina experienced high levels of inflation, i.e.
hyperinflation leve ls. This is the main reason for a high value of 10 in
Argentina. The Congo , too reached hyperinflation levels in the later period as
high as 23773% . Uruguay and Indonesia on the other hand have
experienced lower inflation levels .
Table 4.2 Minimum and maximum values calculated for the variables
in the model in SACCo
1994/95
VAt<IAltsLt: ;i . <"' MINIMUM' . MAXIMUM
~!~~t!(,~~~~ VALUE FOR
. iHE\IARIA~I:-E THE:VARIABLE






252 i 2.600 (Lesotho) 10.3194 14.7591 (Lesotho)
(Mozambique) ; (Botswana) I
CM -0.0006 I 0.0911 10.00004 (South 10.08676
(Mauritius) I (Se chelles) Africa) (Se chelles
PO 2.10 (Mauritius) I 81.34 (South 1 15.17 88.03 (Zambia)
I Africa) i (Mozambi ue)
GC 12.58 70.00 (Namibia) 113.12 (Zambia) 180.00 (Namibia)
(Mozambi I I
I PCGOP 91.93 1 111.49 17278.57
(Mozambique I (Mozambique) . (Seychelles)
10 -0.58 (Mauritius) 1.61 (Mauritius) / 599.45 (Zambia)
I
Source: Estimates .
In SADC, Namibia had the lowest Fi in the ear lier period as explained above .
However, the situation reversed in the later period when Namibia had a
higher Fi value of 123.17. South Africa on the other hand had the highest Fi
in the region in the ear lier period . In the later period, Malawi had the highest
Fi value. In the ear lier period , Lesotho, who pegged to the South African
Rand, had a very low Fi value . In this period, Lesotho had a value of 1.20
which is very close to a completely pegged exchange rate. Swaz iland who
also pegged to the Rand on the other hand, had a relatively high Fi value in
both periods. Authorities intervened greatly in the foreign exchange market.
The least developed and least open economy in SADC is Mozambique. The
most developed economy is Seychelles with the highest level of capital
mobility. The most open economy is Lesotho . As stated earlier on, Lesotho
trades a lot with South Africa, while South Africa trades a lot with the highly
developed economies, i.e. the United States, Japan , Germany, Australia and
the United Kingdom.
One can conclude that in SADC as a whole or on average, exchange rates
have become less flexible; economies more open; capital less mobile ;
external trade not well diversified but still highly concentrated; the level of
development still low but rising in the Seychelles, Mauritius and Botswana ;
and the inflation differential although moderate, but still high in Zambia and
Zimbabwe. The above table and the tables in the appendix revea l this.
In each of the time periods in the study , i.e. the period 1984/85 and 1994/95,
three regressions have been performed. The main difference between these
regressions emanated from the dummy variable for the European Community
(Ee ) countries . In the first regression of each of the time periods, this dummy
variable includes only those EC members who are members of the EMU.
These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, France ,
Germany, Ireland, Italy , Luxembourg , Portugal , and Spain . The second
regression includes as one of the dummies all the EC countries. These are all
the members of the EMU and additionally, the United Kingdom , Greece,
Denmark and Sweden. The third regression includes as one of the dummies
those EMU' members who had met the criteria for joining the EMU by 1996.
These countr ies are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands.
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4.6 The two main problems: Endogeneity and
Heteroscedasticity
4.6.1 Heteroscedasticity. It is found that heteroscedasticity is present in
the data. It is present mainly in one of the 1994/95 data set. The extent of the
presence of heteroscedasticity in the data is shown in the table below.
Table 4.3: The extent of the presence of Heteroscedasticity in the data




EMU & SADC 58.54 10.0000
EC & SADC 74.53 0.0000

















Notes: 1. The Chow test below shows that there is no structural stability
between the models of the two time periods. Therefore the data for the
two time periods should not be pooled ,
2. There is 1 degree of freedom
It is clear from the above table that heteroscedasticity is highly present in the
pooled regression. However, the Chow test below reveals that this regression
is not very useful in this study since there is structural instability between the
two time periods studied here. Therefore, combining the two time periods into
one regression is not reasonable. The results of the pooled regression are
given in the appendix only for comparison purposes. In the other regressions,
heteroscedasticity is mainly present at the 20% level of significance. It is
highly present in the regression including the EMU countries that had met the
criteria for joining the EMU by 1996 and the SADC countries at the 5% level
of significance.
In order to treat heteroscedasticity, one can use weighted least squares
(WLS) or Robust standard errors. In this study , we estimate the model with
robust standard errors.
4.6.2 Endogeneity. The 10 variable is endogenous in the model. One way
to treat endogeneity is to find an instrumental variable. OLS estimation
in the presence of endogeneity results in inconsistent estimators of the
coefficients. Therefore one cannot rely on the t-statistics and the
standard errors estimated. The method of instrumental variables
ensures that the estimates are consistent.
A variable found to be a good instrument for the lO is the changes in
the money supply. Changes in the money supply are highly correlated
to the 10 variable but not to the Fi variable. The correlation coefficient
between Fi and changes in money supply in the pooled model was
0.08, in the 1984/85 model it was 0.01 and 0.02 in the later model. The
changes in the money supply do affect the level of inflation in an
economy. Conventional economic theory suggests that an increase in
the money supply leads to an increase in the inflation rate. Therefore,
there should be a positive and strong relationship between money
supply and the inflation rate , and therefore the inflation differential.
This is found to be true when the changes in the money supply are
fitted against the 10. Correlation statistics between the inflation
differential and the changes in the money supply are given below for





.•...• .<;} (1984/85) . (1994/95). .
Inflation differential 0.9284 0.9636
and changes in the
Imoney supply
Table 4.4 Correlation between the inflation differential and
changes in the money supply
It is clear from the above table that the 10 and changes in the money
supply are highly correlated. Also , the changes in the money supply
are not correlated to the residuals in the model and therefore, less
correlated with Fi.
4.7 The Chow Test
The Chow Test is used to compare regress ions by testing for structural
stability of regression models. This test is used to determine whether there
has been a structural change between the period 1984/85 and 1994/95 or
not. If there is a structural change, then it is not advisable that the two time
periods be combined into one regression. The assumptions underlying the
Chow test are:
o that the error terms (or the residuals) are normally distributed with the
same variance; and
o that they are independently distributed .
Therefore the null hypothesis is that the regressions are the same, i.e. there
is structural stability between the two regressions. To test this , the F-test is
used in the following manner:
Step 1: Combine the observations from two regressions of the two time
periods,
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i.e. 1984/85 and 1994/95. Then run the regression and determine the
residual sum of squares (RSS), say, S1 with degrees of freedom as nl
+ n2 - k. Where n1 is the sample size for period 1 (the 1984/85
sample) and n2 is the sample size for period 2 (the 1994/95 sample)
and k is the number of parameters estimated including the constant.
Step 2: Then estimate the two time periods individually and obtain their RSS,
say S2 and S3, with degrees of freedom given as n1 - k and n2 - k
respectively. Then add these two RSS and determine S4 = S2 + S3
with degrees of freedom as n1 + n2 - 2k.
Step 3: Obtain S5 =S1 - S4
Step 4: Then determine the F statistic given the assumptions of the Chow
Test as:
F = S5/ k
S4/ (n1 + n2 - 2k )
If the F statistic computed above exceeds the critical F value at the
chosen level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected. This
means that there is structural instability and the two time periods











---------------------- S2 + S3
---------------------- S1 - S4
F = 5478395.67 / 10
5780059.83/ (70 + 70 - 2(10))
=32.13
The critical F statistic is 1.26 . The above F statistic exceeds the critical F
statistic. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis of structural stability. The
observations from the two time per iods , i.e. 1984/85 and 1994/95 cannot be
combined into one regression . Therefore, this study will concentrate mainly
on the individual time period regressions.
4.8 Results
The results of the model are given in this section. The two time periods in this
study have three regressions each . The first regression has a dummy
variable for the EU countries and SADC countries with the rest of the
explanatory variables in the model. The second regression has dummy
variables for the EMU and SADC countries with the rest of the other
variables. The last regression has dummy variables for EMU countries and
SADC countr ies and the rest of the variables in the model. The EMU
countries in the third regression are those who had met the criteria for
entering the Monetary Union by 1996 as indicated earlier on. The results of
the regressions are given in Tab les 4.5 and 4.6. The a-priori expected signs
of the coefficients of the variables are:
• 01 - negative because there is an inverse relationship between
exchange rate flexib ility and openness of the economy as expla ined
earlier.
• PC - negative because there is an inverse relationship between
exchange rate flexibility and the diversification of the external sector as
explained earlier.
• GC - negative because there is an inverse relat ionship between
exchange rate flexibility and geographical concentration of trade.
• PCGDP - positive because there is a positive relationship between
exchange rate flexibility and the degree of economic development as
explained earlier.
• 10 - positive because there is a positive relationship between
exchange rate flexibility and the divergence between inflation rates as
explained earl ier.
• CM - it can be positive or negative, as explained earlier.
• SAOC - a negative sign. SAOC is expected to have a negative sign
because of the hypothesis stated earlier on that SAOC forms an
optimum currency area. A negative sign on this variable will imply that
SAOC has tended to adopt a more fixed exchange rate policy and
therefore forms an optimum currency area . If the sign is pos itive, we
will then reject the hypothesis.
• EMU - a negative sign would indicate that these countries adopted
less flexible exchange rates than other countries in the model. These
countries are members of a monetary union at present. However in the
period 1994/95, most of the members had not met the criteria for
joining the monetary union. A positive sign would indicate that these
countries adopted more flexible exchange rates than other countries in
the model.
• EC - the sign can be positive or negative since certain countries do
not form part of the EMU. Therefore, the sign will depend on whether
flexibility of the exchange rate is more dominant or not.
• EMUmetcr - a negative sign is expected and will indicate that these
countries adopt less flexible exchange rates. One would expect this to
be highly prevalent in the 1994/95 period since these countries were
closer to enter ing a monetary union than in the 1984/85 period.
The three models that were run are :
Fi = ~1 + ~2 10 + ~3 PC + !34 GC + !35 01 + 06 CM + ~ 7 PCGDP + !38 SADC +
!3~ _I::!'J1 U ---------------- ---- Regression 1
Fi = !31 + !32 iO + !33 PC + !34 GC + !35 01 + !36 CM + !37 PCGOP + !38 SADC +
!39 EU --------------------- Regression 2
-~. "... .:>
Fi = !31 + !32 10 + !33 PC + !34 GC + ~5 01 + !36 CM + !37 PCGOP + !38 SADC +
!39 EMUmetcr -------------------- Regression 3
Sl
Table 4.5 Regression results for the period of 1984/85.
.Regress ion 1 . Regression2 Reqression 3
Variable '. Coefficient,... Robust Coefficient, Robust Coefficient, Robust
Standard Error and Standard Error and T- Standard Error andt-
T~ statistic statistic .statistic
10 5.033501 5.02445 5.070678
(0.331) (0.339) (0.320)
(15.188) (14.804) (15.864)
PC 2.440953 2.425025 2.64061
(1 .777) (1 .772) (1.741)
(1.374) (1.368) (1.517)
GC 2.326724 12.203839 2.575794
(1.751) . (1.670) (1.807)
(1 .328) (1.320) (-1.599)
01 -95.77743 -97 .66537 -104.069f
(60.765) (59.823) (65.092)
(-1.576) (-1.633) (-1.559)
CM -1.236621 I -10.183729 -1 .282589
I (0.810) I (0.851) I (0.808 )
(-1.526) (-1.392) (-1.588)
PCGDP 0.0085857 0.0089394 0.0078109
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
(1.373) (1 .267) (1.256)
SAOC 61.70113 163.02094 67.75182
(115.0067) 1(114.69) (114.61)
(0.537) i (0.550) (0.591)
Europe -51 .8653 1-50.67932 43.70046
dummy I(82.97006) I (109.301) (78.843)
I (-0.625) I (-0.464) (0.581)
Constant 61.08378 166.0602 45.83181
(78.66615) I (77.31492) (78.843)
(0.776) ! (0.854) (0.581)
F(8, 61) = 37.93 I F(8, 61) =38.14 F(8, 61) =40. 19
IProb. F =0.0000 I Prob . F =0.0000 Prob. F =0.0000
IR-sq,uared =0.7124, 1R-sq,uared =0.7125 R-squared =0.7114
INumoer or INumoer of Number of
observat ions =70 i observations =70 observations =70
Notes: The values In parenthesis are the standard errors and t-
statistics (the t-statistics are below the standard errors ).
In table 4.5, the R-squared indicates that 71% of the inter-country variance of
the flexibility index is explained by the variables included in al l the
regressions . The level of significance of the equations as measured by the F-
statistic is very high meaning that all the regressions are jointly significant.
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The estimated parameters are not all in accordance with a priori
expectations. The 10 is highly significant in the model. This means that the
inflation rates were the ones driving the exchange rates in the 1984/85
period. The sign for this variable is positive and meets the a-priori
expectations in all three regressions. Therefore, in this period , it was the
differential inflation rates that drove exchange rate policy .
Other variables do not provide a significant level of explanation of the Fi in
the model. Usually, when the fit of the model is very high (the value of the R-
square) and the t-statistics are insignificant, multicollinearity is the problem.
Multicollinearity is experienced when there is a perfect , or exact linear
relationship among some or all explanatory variables of a regression model
(Gujarati, 1995, 320). Multicollinearity has been tested for by regress ing each
variable in the model against each of the other variables in order to detect if
any of them are highly correlated. None of them are correlated.
The variables that have the a-priori expected signs are 01 , with a negative
sign; PCGOP with a positive sign; and CM has a negative sign.
In regressions 1 and 2, the EMU and the EU dummies variable have negative
signs respectively . In regress ion 1, this indicates that members of the EMU in
the period 1984/85 adopted less f lexible exchange rates than the rest of the
countries in the model. The same appl ies to regress ion 2 for the EU
countries. In regression 3, the EMUmetcr dummy has a positive sign . This
signifies that countries captured by this variable adopted more flex ible
exchange rates. The authorit ies were intervening less in the exchange rate
market.
The SAOC dummy variable has a positive sign in all three regressions,
signifying that SAOC countries adopted more flexible exchange rates in the
period 1984/85. In regression 3, the coefficients on the SAOC and ENlUmetcr
dummy variables indicate that in this period, SAOC members adopted more




Regression results for the period of 1994/95.
Variable
Regression 1 Regression 2
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F(8, 61) = 2.4 ! F(8, 61) = 13.18
Prob. F = 0.0000 IProb. F = 0.0000
R-squared =0.2712 I R-squared =0.2706
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I F(8, 61) = 36.34
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Notes: The values in parenthesis are the standard errors and t-
statistics (the t-statistics are below the standard errors).
In Table 4.6, the R-squared indicates that 31 % of the inter-country variance
of the flexibility index is explained by the var iables included in regression 3
and 27% is explained in the regression 1 and 2. As an indicator of the
explanatory power of the equation, the R-squared indicates the explanatory
power of the equat ion, although moderate, is not unusually low for a cross-
sectional study. The level of sign ificance of the equations as measured by the
F-statistic is very high meaning that the equations are highly significant.
The estimated parameters are not all in accordance with a priori.
expectations. As with the period 1984/85, the 10 is highly significant in the
model in the period 1994/95. This means that the inflation rates were also the
ones driving the exchange rates in the 1994/95 period. The sign for this
variable is positive and meets the a-priori expectations in all three
regressions. However, if you compare this period and the earlier period, it is
obvious from the coefficient of this variable that the role of the 10 as a
determinant of the movements in the exchange rates is more prevalent in the
earlier period , i.e. 1984/85 than in the later period. This is because the
coefficient of this variable in the earlier period is higher than in the later
period.
Other variables that provide a significant level of explanation of the Fi are 01
and CM in all three regressions. These variables also have the a-priori
expected signs. This indicates that openness has significantly determined the
type of exchange rate policy followed in most of the countries in the model.
The significance of the CM variable on the other hand signifies that capital
mobility has significantly determined the type of exchange rate adopted. The
sign on this variable indicates that count ries with high levels of capital
mobility have been adopting less flexible exchange rates. The rest of the
variables do not provide a significant level of explanation of the Fi in the
model. Other variables that have the a-priori expected signs are PC, with a
negative sign; and PCGOP with a positive sign.
In all regressior.s , the EMU, EU and the EMUmetcr dummy variables have
positive signs. This signifies that countries captured by these dummy
variables adopted more flexib le exchange rates. It was noted earlier on that
the EU countries had not met the criteria for joining the monetary union by
1997. One would expect, therefore that they would not have met the criteria
even earlier that 1997, i.e. the period 1994/95 assessed in this study.
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The SAOC dummy variable has a positive sign in all three regressions,
signifying that SAOC countries adopted more flexible exchange rates in the
period 1994/95, i.e. one would not expect SAOC to have formed an optimum
currency area in this period. In the regressions, the coefficients on the SAOC
and EMU, EU and EMUmetcr dummy variables indicate that in this period,
SAOC members adopted less flexible exchange rates than the countries
captured by these other dummies. SAOC adopted flexible exchange rates but
less so than the EMU countries in this period.
4.9 The results of the 1979 study by Holden, et. at
The model that was estimated is:
Fi = ~ 1+ ~2 01 + ~3 CM + ~4 PC + ~5 GC + ~6 PCGOP + ~7 10
The model was estimated in linear form using ordinary least squares on the
cross sectional data for 75 countries. It shouid, however be noted that a
different sample was used from the one used in the present study . The
reason for this is that firstly, the present study has to incorporate SAOC
members in the sample, which the Holden et.al (1979) study did not
incorporate . Secondly , enough data for some countries which were
incorporated in the sample for the Holden et.al (1979) study is not available
in the periods analysed in this study .
The expected signs of the coeff icients are as given earlier. The following
results were retrieved from regressing the above model:
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Table 4.7: Results from the Holden et.al regression (1974/75)
Variable coefficient standard t-statistic beta
coefficient error ,.. . . ...
Constant .19306 .0412 4.686 -
01 -.03616 .0171 2.109 .1978
PC -.00134 .5880 2.278 .2363
10 .96875 .2529 3.830 .3676
PCGOP .48489 .1346 3.581 .3687
GC -.85573 .8007 1.068 .1029
CM -.01066 .0279 0.382 I .0357
R2= .4195;
SEE= .1030;
F(6, 68) = 8.189;
F probe = .0000
Source: Holden , Merle Holden, and Esther C. Suss, The Determinants of
Exchange Rate flexibility: An Empirical Investigation (1979) .
The R2 (R-squared) indicates that 42% of the inter-country variance of the
flexibility index is explained by the variables included in the regression. The
R2 indicates the explanatory power of the equation. The level of significance
of the equation as measured by the F-statistic exceeded 99%. The estimated
parameters on all variables were in accordance with a priori expectations. 01,
PC, PCGOP and 10 were significant at 5% level. One variable was, however,
not significant and that is the CM variable. The beta coefficients ascertain the
importance of each explanatory var iable. The higher the beta coefficient, the
higher the level of explanatory power a variable gives to the exchange rate
flexibility. The inflation differential variable and the degree of economic
development variable contribute the most to the explanation of the flexibi lity
index. The importance of the inflation differential variable suggests that the
more a country's inflation rate diverges from the world rate , the more
appropriate a flexible exchange rate is. Also, the importance of the degree of
economic development variable suggests that countries with relatively
developed goods markets are prepared to follow a flexible exchange rate.
What is surprising is the low significance of the openness variable given the
importance that this variab le is usually accorded to by optimum currency area
literature.
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4.9 Comparisons between the Holden et.al model and the
present model
Regressions of the model without the dummy variables are given in the
appendix. These regressions make it easier for one to compare the results
from the period 1974/75 and the periods analysed in this study . In the period
1984/85, the fit of the model as given by the R-squared is very high because
it is 71%. In the period 1994/95, the fit is relatively low at 25%. However, the
F- statistic is highly significant implying that the model is significant in both
periods analysed by the present study.
In both periods of the present study, i.e. 1984/85 and 1994/95, it can be
seen that the 10 plays the major role in explaining the movements in the
exchange rates . The 10 positively determines the Flexibility of an exchange
rate. This variable is highly significant in both periods of the present study . In
the 1974/75 study however, the 10 did not play such a major role, but still, it
was the second most significant variable in the model. Inflation rates have
therefore affected the exchange rates in past decades. They have positively
determined the flexibility of the exchange rate .
In the period 1994/95, the PC and PCGDP var iables were significant at the
10% level of significance. This means that in this period, the level of
diversification of the external sector strongly determined exchange rate
flexibility. PC is negative, refuting a-priori expectations. However, in the
earlier period, PC has a positive coefficient suggesting that highly
concentrated economies tended to adopt more flexible exchange rates .
Although this was not an expected result, these results are insignif icant.
In the earlier period, the other sign ificant var iable in the model is CM. CM is
significant at the 5% level of significance and therefore it is highly significant.
The sign on this variable is negative, suggesting that economies where
capital is highly mobile had tended to adopt less flexible exchange rates .
Now the question is: what do the above results suggest about the hypothesis
posed earlier on in the chapter? The SADC dummy variable in the above
models is not significant. This suggests that there has not been
harmonisation on the exchange rate markets between the members of SADC.
The results also suggest that SADC would have been more of an optimum
currency area in the earlier period , i.e. 1984/85 than in the later period , i.e.
1994/95. This is because the coefficient on this variable in all the regressions
performed is higher in the earlier period than the later period . The results
also suggest that SADC would have been more of an optimum currency area
in the earlier period than the European countries in all the categories, since
the SADC dummy had higher coefficients than all three Europe dummies in
this period. However in the later period it's the vice versa. One can therefore
conclude that SADC does not form an optimum currency area.
5. Conclusion
SADC has as one of its wider objectives the formation of a monetary union in
the future , given that the European Monetary Union has paved the way for
the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. As is revealed in this study,
SADC does not form an optimum currency area . If a region forms an optimum
currency area , it indicates that the coordination of exchange rate policy,
monetary policy and fiscal policy is optimal. The coordination of these
policies implies that the countries concerned can form a monetary union.
SADC does not conform to the criteria for forming an optimum currency area.
The main criteria used in this study are the criteria determined by Holden ,
et.al in 1979. They developed a model for determining the flexibility or fixation
of the exchange rate. This model has been used in this study to determine if
SADC does form an optimum currency area or not. The criteria include:
5.1 Opening up the economies. This is revealed by the ratio of imports
and exports to GDP. SADC economies are relatively open , but not
mostly towards each other . Trade between SADC members is not very
high, however these countries tend to trade a lot with the highly
developed countr ies such as the US, Japan , Germany, etc. The Trade
Protocol that aims to improve trade within SADC may be the right step
towards improving trade in SACCo It has to be emphasised that this
study is limited to the period 1994/95. It wou ld be interesting to see how
SADC has improved since 1995 regarding openness and other
assessment criteria for forming an optimum currency area. The main
problem which may, perhaps inhibit such an analysis would be the
availab ility of the data, since the most recent data is not yet fully
available for one to be able to perform a full study as has been done in
this one.
5.2 The level of economic development. There are huge gaps between
the members of SADC regarding the level of econom ic development.
Development levels have not converged in SADC. The level of economic
l)()
development is measured here by the GOP per capita. On the one
extreme, Seychelles is the most developed economy in SAOC.
Seychelles has a GOP per capita of $7278.57. This is for the period
1994/95. Mozambique is on the other extreme with a GOP per capita of
only $111.49. This would inhibit any attempts towards the harmonisation
of exchange rate policy in the region .
5.3 The diversification of the external sector. A number of SAOC
members are still highly concentrated. Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho ,
Malawi and Mauritius have concentration levels of 88%, 75%, 74%, 64%
and 53% respectively. This is measured by the percentage contribution
of the highest export to total exports according to the two digits SITC. On
the other hand, countries such as Mozambique, South Africa , Namibia
and Zimbabwe are more diversified with the values of 15%, 26%, 27%
and 30% respectively. .
5.4 Geographical concentration of trade. There is divergence also on the
geographical concentration of trade in SAOC. Namibia 's trade is the
most concentrated in SAOC. Up to 80% of total trade is done with South
Africa. On the other extreme, Zambia is the least concentrated with a
value of 13% of total trade.
5.5 Capital mobility. Capital is not highly mobile in SAOC. There is not
much movement of capital within SAOC. However there are measures in
place to improve the movement of capital in SAOC. This is one of the
goals that SAOC aims to achieve in the next few years as mentioned in
the first chapter of this study.
5.6 Differences in inflation rates. There is a lot of divergence in the
inflation differential of the SAOC members. Zambia and Zimbabwe are
on one extreme with the inflation differentials of -599.45 and -107.15
respectively. On the other extreme , Seychelles and Mauritius have
inflation differential values of -1.24 and 1.61 respectively. Low inflation
differentials are one of the conditions for optimum currency area
formation . Therefore, the divergence in SAOC on this variable inhibits
the region in terms of optimum currency area formation.
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The above criteria reveal that SAOC is not ready for an optimum currency
area. SADC has, therefore not converged on the bas ic criteria for forming a
monetary union . Also , it was revealed in the earlier chapters that SAOC has
high debt levels. The levels of debt to GOP were one of the criteria
determining whether a country can join the EMU. The debt to GOP ratio had
to be at least 60% , economies had to have been growing at least at 3% per
annum and the budqet deficit should not have been more than 1.8% of GOP.
It has been shown that not all SAOC members are growing at above 3% per
annum, but on average, SAOC is growing at above 3% per annum (see
Appendix A).
Other arguments work ing against SAOC forming a monetary union are the
rigid ities found in prices and wages. Prices are biased upwards in SAOC.
Also, capital is highly immobile between the traded and the non-traded goods
sectors in most SAOC member countr ies. Unless the above factors are
addressed, SAOC cannot form an optimum cur rency area.
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APPENDIX A
GOP growth (annual %) in SAOC
Year Lesotho Namibia Swaziland South Botswana Zambia Zimbabwe Angola
I: . Africa
1980 -3 .. 11 8 14 3 14 ..
1981 1 1 2 7 10 6 13 ..
1982 4 -1 1 -2 7 -3 3 ..
1983 -9 -2 2 -3 16 -2 2 ..
1984 3 a 6 6 12 a -2 ..
1985 9 -1 4 -3 7 2 7 ..
1986 2 5 12 a 7 1 2 3
1987 5 4 15 3 9 3 1 8
1988 13 0 7 4 15 6 8 6
1989 13 2 9 2 13 -1 5 0
1990 4 -1 1 9 0 6 a 7 0
1991 1 10 2 -1 , 9 0 6 -1I
1992 4 6 1 -21 61 -2 -91 -5
1993 4 -2 3 1 0 7 1 -24
1994 13 71 3 3 4 -31 7 1
1995 9 3 3 31 3 -2 -1 11
1996 13 3 4 31 7 6 7 12
1997 8 2, 4 21 7 3 31 8
I .;; . j> ..' ·i ·i--:·-::0"> ):. '>-- · ,....' :j GOP.growth (annual o/t l " . f ····· d < ..;..« -. ·.· .. ;i .. ..... . ...•. -sr .:.: :.' ' '':,: ' o :..~-con mue '. :;>;
\ .\'Y:'(f~F" l Malawi'i Mauritius f\J1o.zambique Seych~lIes T anzania ' CongO) ..·:.· SAOC·:.····::·· · ··· · :' H·:, /··~ · <. " ' - -- :.' . ' .: 'Deni ReP. Average' ...,... .-'..: . " " ., ' .
1980 0, -.. 01.. -4 ! 2 4I
1981 -5 6 51 -8 .. I 2 3
1982 3 51 -7 -1 01 1
1983 4 01 .. 61 -2 1 -1- I
1984 5 51 -6 8 .. 1 6 41
1985 5 7 -1 1 0 0 4I , ..
1986 0 10 -2 1 .. 5 4
1987 2 91 15 4 . . 3 6
1988 3 ( 8 4 I 0 6
1989 1 4 7 101 4 -1 5
1990 6 7 1 91 51 -71 3
1991 9 4 5 3 4 -81 3
1992 -7 6 -81 7 -9 -11 -2
1993 10 5 91 6 121 -13 1
I 1994 -10 4 8 -1 1 -4 2
1995 15 5 4 -1 3 1 4
1996 11 5 7 5 4 -1 6
1997 5 5 12 4 4 -6 4
APPENDIX B - Pooled Regression Estimates
Pooled Regression 1 Pooled Regression2 . Pooled Regression 3
Variable .' Coefficient, Robust Coefficient, 'Robust ....•. .Coefficient, Ropust
.Standard Error and T- Standard Error and.T« .••. Standard Error ·ahd T-
"),' stat istic •
.,.... .
' . ., .. statistic . •... statistic '.... .
10 0.7458428 0.7287515 0.7628624
(0.761) (0.755) (0.770)
(0.980) (0.966) (0.991
PO 0.2696968 0.109222 0.5613383
(1.411) (1 .542) (1.381)
(0.191) (0.071) (0.407)
GC -0.9242532 -1.336471 -0.6508057
(2.286) (2.420) (2.242)
(-0.404) (-0.552) (-0.290)
01 -116.4376 -121.7658 -121.153
(42.319) I (43.032) (44.715)
(-2.751) I (-2.830) (-2.709)
CM 0.1066774 i 0.4240862 -0.0226316
(1,004) I (1.023) (0.988)
(0.106) 1(0.415) (-0.023 )
PCGDP 0.0079242 10.0099854 0.0057686
(0.004) I (0.005) (0.004)
(1.836) (1.921) (1.447)
SADC 40.11539 142.21575 41.30464
(63.736) I (64.44316) (63.460)
(0.629) I (0.655) (0.651)
Europe -109.333 1 -164.924 25.54791
dummy (94.890) I (1 20.39) (68.991)
(-1.152 ) 1(-1.370) (0369)
IYear 31 .73243 131.73243 127.3476
(68.104) I (68.104) I (68.991)
I (0.466) ! (0.466) (0.396)
I Constant 283,0724 I 319,1387 269.6355
I
I (129.69)I (138.589) (136.17)
(2.043) I (2.461) (1.980)
F(9, 128) = 5.00 F(9, 128) = 5.22 F(9, 128) =4.90
I
Prob. F = 0.0000 Prob. F = 0.0000 Prob. F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.0143 R-squared = 0.0259 R-squared = 0.0032
I Number of Number of Number of
I observations = 138 observations = 138 observations = 138
Notes: The values In parenthesis are the standard errors and t- statistics
(the t-statistics are below the standard errors).
Source : estimates.
APPENDIX C - Estimation without the dummy variables
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I Constant 1 48.4884 1212.916
(77.834) I (51.032)
I (0.623) i (4.172)
! F(6, 63) = 50.20 I F(6, 63) = 17.79
I I Ii Prob. F = 0.0000 i Prob. F = 0.0000
I R-squared = 0.7084 " R-squared = 0.2495
I Number of I Number of







I F(7, 130) = 5.93




Notes: The values In parenthesis are the standard errors and t- statistics
(the t-statistics are below the standard errors ).
Source: estimates
APPENDIX D: External Public and Publicly Guaranteed debt outstanding and disbursed (US $ millions)
l yly, . 1<l~l:SU . I . l!:ll:SB
~ ~- -- -'~ I -- - '-.,i!"'>:'+Y,i'i:;"'lj; D';, . ; :-,' ,;t~_P~jq!~ I:~~4r~E3~ .••'.:'.
Angola I - I 80.0 ' - - , 478.0§ 1- I - 1558.0§ 1- 1- I 141.0§
Botswana I 14.2 I 146.7 1466.1 13.2 14.9 27.8 17.4 151.6 493.9 0.6 12.6
- .
Lesotho 7.6 45.2 225.6 0.5 11.4 22.0 8.1 56.5 270.2 0.5 4.8
Malawi 103.0 433.0 1,141.0 20.0 192.0 49.0 122.0 625.0 1,190.0 6.0 68.0
Mozambique - 356.0§ 3,054.0 - 229.0a 746 .0 - 58.5§ 3,800.0 - 94.4§
Swaziland 20.9 160.9 245.3 16.1 24.2 10.1 37.0 185.1 255.4 3.4 16.5
I-- -1------
Tanzania 153.0 1,554.0 3,824.0 97.0 455.0 267.0 250.0 2,009 .0 4,091 .0 I 17.0 174.0
Zambia 120.0 1,501.0 3,671.0 503.0 644.0 523.0 623.0 2,145 .0 4,194 .0 I 64 .0 1287.0
Zimbabwe 85.6 101.0 1,220.0 145.0 595.0 1,010.0 230.0 696.0 2,230.0 I 9.0 150.0
Source : Kisanga, 1991, 147
APPENDIX E: Total debt service (% of GNP)
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Washington, USA.
,I'
H <: 1988 4 9fJ~ ) , 1 9~() I " : ' : ' ~ ( : i< ::J~!8i1· , : i:.i,:··;;"I.~~ ,mm~
." ,," ,", .QQ-:t
;If, ,!:lt[ri!,~[~,m~. ~iliHf,);,%0!ffi.ill i 'ljjj:: i , "W~r~~~~. :)~:·: \·· \.,~:8;isI, ;!i;; ,}':':;',:','i',::k ;:';, .. ;'! :t);~m~~l; ~ ,~,,~,f , i ::'U' ::i ' !::. "!:. ""'; ' i ii :. ' : .: : : ~ : : : : ' ! ': ,: "~ .: : : :,r; :: ': :
Anqola 3,5 3,4 4.0 3.9 7.0 4.7 13,3 20.1 20.3 19.2
Botswana 3.6 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.4 2.0 2,3 2.0 3.1 2,1
Congo, Dern. 4.8 7.3 4.1 2,1 0.9 0,3 0,2 0.5 0.9 0.2
Rep ,
Lesotho 3.0 2,6 2.3 2.7 3,1 3,0 2.6 3.2 2.9 3.6
Malawi 8.2 6,5 7,5 6,0 6.1 3.9 7,0 8.4 4.0 3.1
Mauritius 9.6 6.7 6.0 6.1 5.7 4.0 4.6 5.7 4.6 6.5
Mozambique 4,4 4.7 4.2 4.4 5.9 8.0 7.5 9.3 6.6 4.1
Namibia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Seychelles 6,7 8,1 6.1 5.1 4.3 4.0 3,6 4.8 3,1 2.8----- -
South Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,4 2.6 3.4 3.8
Swaziland 5.4 5.0 5.1 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.5 1.6 2.5 2.2
Tanzania 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.1 2.2
-1-----
Zambia 5.7 5.7 6.7 20.0 12.3 12.1 12.0 80.3 8.2 7.3
Zimbabwe 7.0 5,4 5.5 5.5 9.2 9.8 9.1 9.5 8.1 8.0
AVERAGE 5.4
- --- - _ .
5.05.2 4.9 5.5 5.4 4.9 5.5 11.7 5.5
- --- - -
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